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This thesis tests war termination theories against the 
historical reality of four colonial wars fought in Africa 
and Asia by European powers in the period 1946 to 1974. 
'Victory' was examined by looking at the ideas of 
o' Connor and Carroll. To win a colonial war the imperial 
power must promise to, and be seen to be taking steps 
towards granting eventual independence.Otherwise,the 
colonial power will not win the hearts and minds of the 
population. 
'Termination points' were analysed by applying the 
ideas of Coser,Galtung,Kecskemeti,Klingberg and Voevodsky 
to colonial warfare.It was found that the termination point 
which tipped the balance was the realisation after a 
succession of battle defeats that war was unwinnable. 
Azar' s idea that de-escalation occurred because of 
military setbacks or public opinion pressures was only 
evident in Portugal's war in Mozambique.In Malaya,de-
escalation occurred after British military success.In 
Algeria and Indochina a large military presence was needed 
to stabilise the military situation and maintain civic 
order right up to war's end. 
Regarding factors delaying war termination,it was 
found that France and Portugal's paternalistic approach to 
colonial management,combined with economic necessity and 
the fear of Communism all helped to delay the ending of 
war. 
Randle' s view that political reorientation heralded 
' ' 
V 
the ending of a war seems to be supported by events. So too 
does Halperin and Rothstein's idea of regime change and war 
termination. 
Tactics to secure peace agreements will only be 
effective if one of the belligerents wants war termination 
regardless of political costs.Ideological hatred and 
unrealised war ambitions undermine peace and can lead to 
further bloodshed. 
A framework combining observable behaviour such as 
battle defeats and military and political indicators of a 
war's imminent end has been devised to help policy-makers 
decide when to terminate a war. 
Introduction 
The crude logic of this thesis is as follows. War 
termination theorists have postulated a number of theories 
about the ending of wars.These ideas need to be formulated 
in the form of testable hypotheses and tested against the 
reality of a number of case studies in order to see whether 
or not the propositions stand or need modification. 
In one respect the position of 'War Termination' in 
the field of strategic Studies is similar to that of the 
fairy tale character of Cinderella.Both War Termination and 
Cinderella have suffered from relative neglect. Prior to 
1970 only a few books and articles were written on War 
Termination.However,in 1970 the Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science devoted its entire 
November issue to the important subject of how wars end. 
The interest taken by a concerned body of scholars was 
probably influenced by the Vietnam War ,because in 
1970,American officials were trying to extricate themselves 
from a long and bloody war in Vietnam. 
After 1970,War Termination as an academic subject 
divided into two main areas of interest.The first 
concentrated on the problems associated with the peace-
making process.In 1974 Robert Randle published The Origins 
of Peace and in 1983 Paul Pillar published his book on 
bargaining entitled,Negotiating Peace.The second area was 
Nuclear War Termination, with studies examining the ways 
and means of terminating nuclear war on favourable 
political terms.Nuclear war termination raises issues far 
removed from the termination of colonial wars,and for this 
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reason will not be examined in this thesis. 
The major gap in the literature on war termination is 
the lack of rigorous testing of theory against historical 
reality although Leon Sigal's book,Fighting to the Finish 
tested war termination theory against the reality,of the 
Japanese surrender in World War Two.His conclusions will be 
examined in Chapter One. 
The aim of this thesis is to test war termination 
theories against the historical reality of four case 
studies-the Malayan Emergency,the French wars in Algeria 
and Indo-China and the Portuguese war in Mozambique.These 
are colonial wars fought by European powers from 1946 to 
1974 and provide good opportunities to study the different 
aspects of war termination theory. 
If war termination theory is to stand up it must 
predict when a war will end,and explain why one of the 
belligerents ended up as the winner whilst the other ended 
up a loser.There was a clear cut winner in three of the 
cases examined in this thesis.The Malayan emergency ended 
in 1960 with the British being the eventual winners.The 
Algerian war ended in 1962 · with the FLN attaining their 
core aim of independence .Finally, the war in Mozambique 
ended in 1974 with Frelimo emerging as the victors.We need 
to test whether or not war termination theories explain 
these outcomes. 
War termination theory must also explain why some wars 
do not end with outright victory and why some peace 
settlements do not last very long.This is why the French-
3 
Indo-Chinese war has been included in this analysis.There 
was no clear cut winner in 1954 and peace did not last very 
in that country.We need to find out if there is a 
correlation between partial victory and the length of peace 
settlements.Malaya has been included because the British 
experience seems to have influenced the manner in which 
France and Portugal fought their colonial wars.Moreover, 
Malaya provides an opportunity to consider what factors 
result in victory for the colonial power. 
This thesis will address four basic questions: 
a)Do the war termination theories stand or fall when 
applied to historical reality? b) Do the war termination 
theories need modification? c)Are there any other 
factors,not identified by war termination theorists,which 
nevertheless are important in the war termination process? 
d)What lessons can policy makers draw from this thesis? 
Ideally the answers to these questions will lead to a 
better understanding of how wars end.From the perspective 
of the policy maker,our findings may help officials 
terminate wars,avoid further bloodshed and build durable 
peace settlements. 
The analysis will be carried out in the following 
manner.Chapter One will review the war termination 
literature.Broadly speaking,war termination theories fall 
into three areas:military aspects;the domestic-political 
dimension;and the problems of peace-making.The literature 
review will break down the theories into a number of 
propositions which will be tested in the main body of the 
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thesis.Chapter Two is a comparative study of Revolutionary 
and Counter-insurgency warfare,and is written on the 
assumption that the reader has no prior knowledge of 
colonial warfare. 
Chapter Three through Nine will test the war 
termination propositions. Each of these chapters has the 
same format:a)Proposition. b)Application of proposition to 
Malaya,Indo-China,Algeria and Mozambique. c)Does the 
proposition stand or fall when tested against the case 
study? This structure allows theory to be tested in a 
logical and systematic manner. 
The conclusion will summarise findings,suggest 
modifications,and outline other reasons why wars end.This 
chapter will also discuss policy implications resulting 
from this study.The final chapter will suggest avenues for 
further research. 
War,as someone once said,is hell on earth.This thesis 
is written in the belief that the weight of the dead,the 
anguish of the bereaved and the suffering of the maimed 
make it imperative to develop ways to ,'halt the witless 
engine of war from continuing with the destruction.' 1 
1 Herman Kahn,'Issues of Thermonuclear War Termination,' 




war Termination in Conventional Warfare 
War termination theorists have identified the follow-
ing themes:factors causing victory or defeat; termination 
points; de-escalation; domestic aspects of war termination; 
and the peace-making process.We will now outline and 
discuss these. 
'Victory' 
Berenice Carroll and Raymond G.O'Connor were 
interested in working out a definition of the word, 
'Victory, ' and also sought to explain how this state of 
affairs occurs.Each adopted very different approaches. 
O'Connor tried to find an all embracing definition,whilst 
Carroll analysed the four senses or dimensions in which the 
term,'Victory' could be used. 
According to O'Connor,'Victory' means the following: 
'the cessation of armed conflict under conditions 
satisfactory to at least one of the combatants in terms of 
stated objectives.' 2 
His definition is a broad one, and allows the following 
outcomes to be classified as victory-the attainment of 
independence, the capture of a capital city, the partial 
attainment of aims,unconditional 
pacification of a country. 3 
surrender and the 




Adopting a different approach,Berenice Carroll argued 
that,'Victory' can be used in four ways,depending on the 
type of war being fought and what aims are achieved. Her 
four dimensions are the following:the annihil- ation of an 
opponents military and industrial centres;the relationship 
between aims and outcomes; gain versus loss calculations 
between warring states;and the creation of the relationship 
between victor and vanquished. 4 
Thus Victory is the state of affairs which occurs when 
a belligerent has gained superiority or supremacy over an 
opponent.O'Connor examined how this situation arose,and 
noted that the reasons for victory vary from war to war.For 
example,stability of the rear is necessary to achieve 
victory in a civil war,whilst in a war of liberation the 
support of the population is vital. Controlling one's forces 
is a vital ingredient of victory in a limited war. 5 
These are primary or essential conditions for victory 
but later on we will see that there are numerous additonal 
or secondary causes of victory.For example,in the Gulf War, 
allied control of the air was a primary reason for the 
defeat of Saddam's forces in Kuwait.Control of the air 
allowed a successful ground assault by UN forces whose 
weight of numbers and technological superiority drove the 
Iraqis from Kuwait. 
4 B.A.Carroll,'How Wars End:An Analysis of some Current 





A Termination Point is an indicator or a sign that a 
war is about to end.Theorists examining termination points 
can be loosely divided into two groups and this division is 
based on the methodology used.The first group includes 
Lewis Coser,Johan Galtung and Paul Kecskemeti.The second 
group of theorists identify termination points and attempt 
to mathematically predict when they will occur in a 
war.Frank Klingberg ,John Voevodsky and Berenice Carroll 
fall into this second group. The ultimate aim of 
quantitative analyses of war termination is to predict the 
outcome of a war before it has started in order to provide 
decision makers with, 'Perfect Foresight.' 6 
Lewis Coser identified the existence of 'symbolic 
signposts'which indicate the imminent ending of a war.Among 
his 'signposts' are the capture of a fortress or a capital 
city.Other examples include the capture of items of great 
symbolic importance such as military commanders or 
strategic assets such as oil fields. 7 Johan Galtung 
concurs.He accepted the existence of 'symbolic signposts' 
and further identified the presence of another termination 
point,which he called 'qualitative shifts,' on the 
battlefield.He wrote: 
'Points of termination of conflicts are located where 
there is a transition from change in quantity,to change in 
6 Carroll,'How Wars End:An Analysis of some current 
Hypotheses,'p.304. 
7 Lewis Coser,'The Termination of Conflict' ,Journal of 
conflict Resolution,Vol.4,1961,p.350. 
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quality [ such as the loss of the capital] ... there is a 
qualitative jump because of the symbolic importance of the 
capital even if major administrative functions have been 
transferred elsewhere.' 8 
Paul Kecskemeti has suggested that a war will end when 
its outcome is 'irreversible.' He believed that if one side 
has sufficient reserves to reverse a dire situation it can 
always escalate the conflict until it gains an advantage. 
'Irreversibility' only occurs when all means to achieve 
victory have been exhausted.When this happens,a belligerent 
has the option of negotiation or surrender. 9 Kecskemeti's 
concept necessarily involves military and political 
perceptions about a war's outcome. 
The American experience in Vietnam from 1964 to 1969 
neatly illustrates Kecskemeti's theory.President Johnson's 
military build up in Vietnam was an attempt to reverse a 
military stalemate.The Americans hoped that military 
escaltion would inflict a decisive defeat on the Vietcong 
and their North Vietnamese allies.They were wrong.After the 
Tet Offensive in 1968 American leaders concluded-probably 
incorrectly-that victory was unattainable.Vietnam became an 
issue in the American presidential elections in 1968,with 
Richard Nixon being returned with a pledge to disengage 
from the war. 
Yet there have been cases when states have had the 
8 Johan Galtung,'Institutionalised Conflict Reduction,' 
Journal of Peace Research,Vol.2,(1965},pp.373-374. 
9 Paul Kecskemeti,'Political Rationality in Ending Wars' 
in Annals,Nov 1970,pp.107-109. 
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means to reverse an outcome but refrained from actually 
doing so. Take, for example, the war in Bosnia in the mid 
1990s,when NATO states looked over the precipice of 
intervention and chose not to jump.In 1995 the NATO powers 
clearly had the military means to reverse the desperate 
situation of the Bosnian Muslims.They chose not to because 
of the risks involved with escalation.Bitter memories of 
past wars seem to have influenced the USA and its NATO 
allies .Mindful of their Vietnam defeat,American leaders 
were reluctant to involve themselves in another civil 
war.Remembering that a similar Bosnian crisis ignited World 
War One,European states,and in particular Britain,refused 
to aid the Bosnian Muslims. It was not the prospect of 
losing that worried Europeans the most.Rather it was the 
risk of the war spreading to the wider Balkan region that 
influenced their decision not to intervene. 
Does this mean that Kecskemeti is wrong? Far from 
it. In the light of the Bosnian experience, Kecskemeti 's 
principle needs to be slightly modified.Clearly,wars end 
when the outcome is irreversible, and this occurs when 
escalation has failed to achieve victory.However,the 
outcome is also irreversible if states refrain from 
escalation for fear of widening a war. 
Frank Klingberg identified four variables that could 
influence policy makers in their decision to terminate a 
war.These are:army size ratios;casualty ratios; intensity 
of fighting and proportion of battle defeats.According to 
him,if any two variables are unfavourable for two campaign 
10 
periods then an ending is in sight. 10 He wrote: 
' ... most wars end within a fairly short time after 
certain significant shifts in trends occur. Such shifts 
often appear immediately after a final great effort has 
ended in failure, like the great German drive in the spring 
of 1918.'u 
Klingberg's theory does not seem to apply to 
revolutionary warfare movements whose leaders are content 
simply not to lose the war.For instance,during the Franco-
Algerian war the FLN lost the battle of Algiers in 1957 and 
suffered heavy losses at the time of the Challe plan in 
1959.Yet the FLN leaders did not surrender but continued 
the war up to 1962. 
John Voevodsky tried to find the maximum pain 
threshold that a nation will tolerate before it terminated 
a war.Basing his analysis on American involvement in five 
wars, Voevodsky rightly concluded that there is a clear 
limit in casual ties that a nation will tolerate. 12 When the 
pain is insufferable a state either accepts defeat,changes 
its leadership,or acquires new allies.u This analysis has 
two weaknesses.First,he assumes that other states will act 
io Frank L.Klingberg,'Predicting the Termination of War: 




2 John Voevodsky,'Quantitative Behaviour of Warring 
Nations',Journal of Psychology,Vol.72,May 1969. 
u ibid,pp.270-279. 
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in the same manner as American leaders. 14 Second,his 
analysis ignores ideological and pyschological factors 
which may exert a stronger influence on 
behaviour,particularly for revolutionary warfare 
movements.For example,in the Vietnam War the North 
Vietnamese suffered heavy losses from American bombing 
campaigns but despite this refused to capitulate. 
Berenice Carroll listed nine variables that she 
believed influenced war termination.These are:the aims of 
the belligerents; the situation at the time; 
morale;costs;vulnerability; potential reserves;domestic 
conditions;external factors;and peace terms. 15 Later on we 
will see that Carroll has correctly identified most of the 
factors affecting when and how a war will end. 
This thesis will not adopt the mathematical approach 
favoured by Carroll,Klingberg and Voevodsky partly because 
the author lacks the mathematical background, and partly 
because he is sceptical of the mathematical approach to the 
' 
study of war and international politics.His scepticism is 
based on the view that the assignment of value to each 
variable is a subjective process.Moreover it is also clear 
that the value of each variable will fluctuate rather than 
remain constant. 
De-Escalation 
14 Berenice Carroll,'War Termination and Conflict Theory,' 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science,Nov 1970,pp.20-21. 
15 Carroll, 'How Wars End .... ' ,pp.314-315. 
12 
The word,' De-escalation' means the winding down of 
military hostilities or reducing the level of violence.De-
escalation is the result of political decisions to wind 
down a war, and usually occurs after heavy battlefield 
losses or the non-attainment of aims.Edward Azar and Robert 
Randle are the two theorists whose ideas on de-escalation 
will be examined in this thesis.Azar was principally 
concerned with finding out why de-escalation 
occured, whereas Randle 
escalation. 
looked at the symptoms of de-
After analysing the 1956 Suez Crisis,Azar observed a 
dramatic shift in British and French aims.In less than two 
weeks these two states changed their original aim of 
reversing the Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal to 
a reluctant acceptance of this new state of affairs . 16 
Azar concluded that: 
' .. as costs .. increase,as preferences are modulated or re-
ranked,and as public opinion in favour of de-escalation 
' increases,nation states who are in the midst of a crisis 
are likely to move towards the temporary reduction of 
hostile interactions by moving back to their pre-crisis 
relations range. t1.7 
Clearly,the Suez Crisis provides a useful example of 
de-escalation,but two points need to be made.De-escalation 
by the British and French was largely brought about by 
16 Eward E.Azar,'Conflict Escalation and Reduction in 




American pressure on Britain,rather than non-attainment of 
military aims.Therefore,in some situations states or 
international organisations such as the UN,which are in-
directly involved in a war,can bring about a de-escalation 
of hostilities.This might be achieved by economic 
pressure,such as trade embargoes,the cessation of military 
support to one of the belligerents,or policing ceasefires. 
Second,Suez was more of a crisis than a war.Management 
of a crisis is different from terminating a war because 
wars and crises differ.A crisis is defined as a,'momentous 
juncture in war,politics,commerce or domestic politics.' 18 
War on the other hand is a,'contest carried on by force of 
arms between nations or between parties of the same state;a 
state of hostilities with suspension of ordinary 
international relations ... ' 19 Thus,crisis is a much broader 
term than war.This is not to say that nothing can be learnt 
from the termination of crises but one needs to be careful 
about drawing lessons from one situation and applying them 
to another which is conceptually different. 
Robert Randle looked for signs indicating the 
beginning of the de-escalation process. Symptoms of de-
escalation, he believed,were military withdrawal from 
certain areas;a reduction in bomb attacks;a shift to more 




discriminate attacks against the enemy. 20 Randle implies 
that a state can control de-escalation by choosing what to 
attack.This,of course,assumes that the opponent will be 
able to read the de-escalation signals properly,although in 
the fog of war this might be difficult. 
Domestic Aspects of War Termination. 
The problems associated with the domestic aspects of 
war termination have been analysed by Morton Halperin, 
Robert Rothstein,Paul Kecskemeti,Leon Sigal,Robert 
Randle,George Quester,Michael Handel,Fred Ikle and Lewis 
Richardson. The main issues in domestic war termination 
theory relate to the factors delaying war termination and 
'reorientation.' 
Broadly speaking,writers have offered four 
explanations as to why war termination is sometimes 
delayed.The first group,comprising Halperin,Rothstein and 
. 
Sigal,looked at the way government bureaucracy can delay 
the termination of war.The second group,typified by Handel 
offer a'Rational choice 'model to show how wars end.A third 
type of study,used for example by Richardson,dealt with the 
impact of public opinion on the ending of war.The fourth 
explanation, adopted by Ikle, saw war termination as a 
struggle between 'hawks and doves.'The common thread which 
runs through all these studies is the conflict between the 
20 Robert Randle,The Origins of Peace:A study of Peace-
Making and the structure of Peace Settlements,(New 
York:Free Press,1973),p.476. 
15 
various interest groups within society on the issue of war 
termination. 
Morton Halperin,Robert Rothstein and Leon Sigal have 
examined how bureaucratic politics can delay the ending of 
wars.Halperin's argument runs as follows.Government is 
composed of several diverse interest groups ranging from 
legislatures, executive bodies,the military establishment 
and foreign offices.Securing agreement between these groups 
on the issue of war termination is difficult,usually 
because each group has its own policy agenda,its own aims 
to achieve and budgets to maintain. 21 Rothstein agreed with 
Halperin's analysis and concluded that a bureaucracy 
steeped in compromise could delay war termination because 
it could not act decisively enough. 22 
Thinking along similar lines to Halperin and 
Rothstein,Leon Sigal argued that a government bureaucracy 
suffered from a kind of 'structural indecision' which was 
built into the system.Compromise politics was not the 
' 
problem-it was merely a symptom of a wider malaise caused 
by the fact that the individual components of a government 
followed their own agendas,priorities and routines,with the 
result that a government was constantly tugged in different 
directions.In this environment war termination was 
21 Morton Halperin,'War Termination and Civil-Military 
Relations,'Annals,Nov 1970,pp.86-93. 
22 Robert Rothstein,'Domestic Politics of Peacemaking,' 
Annals,Nov 1970,pp.65-66. 
inevitably delayed. 23 Testing this theory 
16 
against 
historical reality,Sigal concluded that organisational 
politics provided the clearest explanation for the delay in 
the Japanese decision to surrender at the end of the Second 
World War.For Sigal,the great tragedy of the,'Pacific 
Endgame' was the unnecessary use of the atomic bombs 
against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.He has cited abundant 
evidence to back up his claim that Japan was on the brink 
of surrender in August 1945 because its navy had been 
destroyed and it had lost control of the air. 24 
The bureauctic approach as a way of thinking about war 
termination has one major weakness.It ignores the impact of 
strong,charismatic leaders on government policy making.For 
example,it is particularly ironic that Sigal's explanation 
for the Japanese surrender in the Pacific does not 
adequately explain the Nazi surrender in Europe in May 
1945.Germany did not surrender until eleven months after 
the D Day landings of June 1944. During this period the 
Nazis lost control of France,Holland,Belgium,Norway, 
Russian territories and Poland.Despite these losses Hitler 
refused to stop fighting.So strong was Hitler's refusal to 
capitulate that he chose suicide rather than surrender, 
leaving his successor,Admiral Doenitz,the humiliating task 
of opening peace talks with the Allied powers.Clearly,the 
bureaucratic model as an explanation for delay in the 
23 Leon Sigal,Fighting to a Finish,(Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press,1988),pp.19-25. 
24 ibid' pp. 283-286. 
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ending of war,makes no allowances for the Hitlers of this 
world. 
Both Paul Kecskemeti and Michael Handel adopted what 
Leon Sigal termed a 'Rational Choice Model' to explain why 
war termination is delayed.Sigal believed that politicians 
act rationally and calculate potential gains against 
potential losses. Following this line of thought Michael 
Handel,for example,listed several factors that could 
postpone war termination.These included:the view that 
bargaining could weaken the political and military 
position;the fear of a harsh peace;the feeling that 'time 
is on our side' ; the desire to secure a better peace. 25 
Paradoxically,these choices are rational ones.After all it 
is clearly beneficial for a state to obtain the best 
possible deal,even if it does mean continued bloodshed.A 
good illustration of Handel's point is Richard Nixon's 
policy towards Vietnam.Nixon realised that the Vietnamese 
war was unwinnable,yet at the same time he also knew that 
. 
if America withdrew,then the south Vietnamese regime would 
be at the mercy of the National Liberation Front and its 
allies in North Vietnam.Thus America gradually withdrew its 
forces and trained Southern Vietnamese forces,in a policy 
known as 'Vietnamisation.' Nixon's rational choice 
therefore delayed war termination in Vietnam. 
Another factor which delays the decision to end a war 
is the 'political mood' of a country.This idea dominates 
25 Michael Handel,'The study of War Termination,'Journal 
of strategic studies,Vol.1,(1),May 1978,pp.70-71. 
18 
two articles written by Lewis Richardson in the late 
1940s.Richardson studied the impact of public opinion 
during the First World War. 26 He suggested that war 
termination will not occur unless war weariness has gripped 
the population.Anyone who tries to terminate a war before 
war weariness has occurred will usually fail. Lenin and 
stalin,from 1914 to 1917,tried in vain to turn the Russian 
proletariat against the war,but failed because war 
weariness was not widespread enough to have any effect on 
morale. 27 
Ikle has suggested another reason why war termination 
can be delayed.He compared the struggle to end a war with 
a battle between 'hawks' and 'doves' in society.Until this 
domestic political conflict is resolved,the war will 
continue.He noted that a government may be split over 
objectives,with some leaders believing that the war's 
outcome must justify previous sacrifices. 28 
These,it is argued, are the main reasons why delays 
occur in war termination but there have been instances 
where other reasons seem to apply.For example,Quester has 
suggested that if a belligerent misunderstands a peace 
signal war termination will be delayed.A good example of 
this occurring was the Japanese decision to surrender in 
26 Lewis Richardson,'War Moods' ,Psychometrika,vol.13 
(3)Sept and Dec 1948. 
27 Lewis Richardson,'War Moods I' ,Psychometrika,vol.13 
(3)Sept 1948,pp.154-159. 
28 Fred Charles Ikle,Every War Must End(New York and 





1945.In early 1945,junior Japanese officials secretly sent 
peace feelers to the Americans,which were not acted upon by 
American diplomats,possibly because the Japanese 'doves' 
were regarded as too junior and not representative of the 
Tojo government. 29 
In a different vein,Fred Ikle also noted that 
conflicting military advice could delay the ending of 
war.For example a civilian leader may want to know whether 
a military situation could be stabilised before agreeing to 
withdraw.This decision is clearly dependent on the quality 
of military advice and the reliablity of military estimates 
regarding an enemy's intentions and military capability.The 
process is further complicated by differing military 
perceptions forcing military leaders at all levels to 
favour one report over another. 3 ° For example, in March 
1943,the Italian leader Benito Mussolini was warned by his 
military advisers that Germany faced imminent defeat in 
Russia.He was also warned that a German defeat would be 
' 
disastrous for the Italian military position.Despite these 
grim reports,Mussolini chose to fight on confident of 
victory. 31 History proved him wrong. 
'Re-orientation' was the second major issue examined 
by theorists concerned with the domestic aspects of war 
termination. This was a term used by Paul Kecskemeti and 
29 George Quester,'Wars Prolonged by Misunderstood 
Signals,'Annals,Nov 1970,pp.32-33. 
30 Ikle,pp.19-37. 
31 ibid' pp. 34-5. 
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referred to a process whereby political and military 
leaders decided to disengage from a war. There are many 
reasons for this change of heart.It may occur due to the 
belief that further resources spent on continuation of the 
war will be wasted for few or no gains,or it may result 
from the convergence of values,or the perception that the 
war is immoral.In addition,leaders may calculate that the 
state might not be able to afford additional defence 
expenditure. 32 
When it comes to 're-orientation,'Richardson and 
Randle have suggested that war weariness is a critical 
factor.According to Richardson,for war weariness to develop 
there must be a body or group of 'pre-war'defeatists within 
a society.As the war progresses war weariness will spread 
through the population by internal dissent. 33 The longer 
the war,the more war weariness will grow. 34 War termination 
will arise when about half the survivors demand peace. 35 
Robert Randle has outlined other reasons why war weariness 
. 
develops. The political mood might dramatically change 
because of defeats on the battlefield,or because of the 
threat of invasion or because there is no end to the war in 
sight. 36 
32 Paul Kecskemeti,'Political Rationality in Ending War,' 
pp.108-115. 
33 Lewis Richardson,'War Moods II' ,Psychometrika,vol.13 
(4)Dec 1948,pp.210-212. 
34 Lewis Richardson, 'War Moods II' , p. 215. 
35 Lewis Richardson, 'War Moods II' ,p. 227. 
~ Randle,pp.77-79. 
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The internal struggle to terminate the war is a 
painful and sometimes lengthy process.For a politician it 
means admitting defeat and conceding that previous policies 
were wrong. Politicians closely associated with the war 
might be removed from office in a General Election.Field 
commanders,might be sacked or overruled by General Staff. 37 
Small wonder then that fighting is more often preferable to 
war termination. 
Ceasefires and Peacemaking 
In the war termination literature,'Peacemaking' is the 
complex interaction between six variables:the type of war 
being fought;war aims;domestic politics; coalition 
relations; the military situation;and 'de-
ideologisation.' 38 Randle's book,The Origins of Peace, 
deals comprehensively with the peacemaking process.Pillar's 
study is more limited in its scope,confining itself to 
studying ways of securing agreement during the bargaining 
. 
process,which necessarily involves studying both military 
and diplomatic tactics to generate political results. 
Randle makes five crucial points about the peacemaking 
process.His first,and perhaps most obvious,point to make is 
that different types of wars have different outcomes.For 
example,a war can end in victory,defeat or stalemate. 
Second,the peace process becomes more complicated if many 
states and/or alliances take part in the negotiations. 
37 Halperin,pp.94-95;See also Ikle,Chapters 4-5. 
38 Randle,The Origins of Peace,pp.18-23. 
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Accommodating the wishes of all the participants is 
extremely difficult and necessarily involves compromise and 
horse trading. 39 For instance,the Versailles Peace 
Settlement of 1919 involved the Allied victors and the 
defeated Central powers.The peace process was complicated 
by the divergent aims of Britain,France and 
America. Clemenceau and Lloyd-George wanted to -punish the 
Germans,while President Wilson was more interested in 
granting self determination to the empires of the 
vanquished powers. 
According to Randle,peace-makers are also influenced 
by wider political considerations.They might be concerned 
with the effect of a peace agreement on surrounding states 
or they might have limited bargaining power. 40 During the 
Franco-Indochinese war U.S.military planners considered 
using American planes to aid the French garrison in Dien 
Bien Phu.Fear of what China might do tipped the balance in 
favour of non-intervention,a decision which possibly 
' 
weakened the French bargaining position at the peace talks 
in Geneva. 
Randle also outlined the ways in which domestic 
politics can delay or speed up the peace process.First, 
divisions between policy-makers 










war aims and,by so doing decides to negotiate. 42 • 
Both Randle and Pillar identify several phases in the 
peace process.According to Pillar there are three phases in 
peace negotiations.Phase one is the period of uncertainty, 
and mistrust. 43 The main problems in this phase are 
procedural,the main question being:'When is the best time 
to open peace talks?' 44 Negotiations will probably open 
once parties,'arrive at a common view of the future course 
of a war,and both become aware that they hold such a common 
view. ' 45 This occurs if the military situation is 
impossible to reverse,if resources are exhausted,or if one 
side can bring more resources to bear on an opponent."6 For 
example during the Franco-Algerian War peace talks opened 
after the failure of the Challe Plan to destroy the FLN.The 
first phase could be compared to the first stage in the 
final of a karate championship.Each athlete,tired and wary 
after the qualifying rounds,circles the other,looking for 
a place to attack,looking for weaknesses in the opponent's 
defences. 
In the second phase,both sides have a reasonably clear 
idea of the substantive issues dividing them and also a 
fairly good grasp of each other's motives. 'They believe 
42 ibid, pp .13-14. 
43 Paul Pillar,Negotiating Peace:War Termination as a 
Bargaining Process,(Princeton NJ:Princeton University 
Press,1983),p.102. 
44 ibid,pp.53-58. 
45 ibid, p. 59. 
46 ibid,p. 59. 
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that a bargaining range exists and hence that a negotiated 
peace is possible. ' 47 This phase usually ends after each 
side has made a large concession. 48 
In the final phase there are usually several distinct 
issues to be resolved.These may include handing over 
prisoners,deciding on demarcation lines or new 
boundaries,and setting time limits for troop withdrawals. 
Usually both sides will make concessions. 49 
Tactics to secure agreement vary. They may include 
military coercion,de-escalation or other activities, which 
have already been outlined in the military section on war 
termination.Diplomats can impose deadlines to secure 
compliance from an opponent.Mendes-France successfully used 
this tactic at the Geneva Peace talks in 1954.0r one side 
may take a hardline approach and refuse to make 
concessions. This policy may be due to fear of arousing 
discontent amongst one's own people. 5 ° Frelimo successfully 
used this tactic at the Lusaka peace talks from June to 
September 1974. 
Randle agrees that there are three phases.~ In fact 
Pillar's three stages could fit neatly into Randle's idea 
of a preliminary stage of peace talks, and a secondary 
one, involving the resolution of the military issues at 




51 Randle ,p. 5. 
r 
25 
stake. Yet Randle, in marked contrast to Pillar, calls his 
final phase the 'political settlement.' This is the most 
difficult part of the war to resolve because it involves 
legal issues and because,although at peace,one side may 
seek to overturn the treaty terms. 52 
Randle therefore echoed an earlier study by Nicholas 
Timasheff who argued that a peace treaty either entirely 
terminated a war,with everyone content with the 
settlement,or relegated the war to 'deeper levels of social 
inter-action. 153 In other words it caused resentment. For 
instance Germany never accepted the territorial limitations 
imposed on it at Versailles in 1919.Peace was merely a 
truce. 54 
War Termination Hypotheses 
Following this review of the literature on war 
termination we now have to turn each of the theories into 
a testable proposition.For the sake of clarity,each of the 
propositions will be grouped under separate headings. 
Unfortunately,not all of these hypotheses can be 
examined,because some of the pertinent archives have not 
been opened to the public.For this reason it is 
particularly difficult to test Sigal's ideas about 
bureaucratic politics and war termination.For example,it is 
~ ibid,p.14,486~93. 
53 Nicholas Timasheff,War and Revolution,(New York:Sheed 
and Ward,1965),p.233. 
54 ibid' p. 234. 
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almost impossible to test the following hypothesis: 'War 
termination is delayed because of bureaucratic infighting' 
For this reason the analysis in Chapter Seven and Chapter 
Eight will concentrate on the ideas of Richardson, Ikle, 
Randle,Halperin,Handel and Rothstein.They are more testable 
because they deal with observable behaviour revealed by 
opinion polls and changes of government. 
For the sake of convenience the hypotheses under 
discussion have been grouped into six categories-'Victory, 
termination points, de-escalation, public opinion and 
prolongation of war, re-orienation and ceasefires and 
peacemaking. 
Victory 
!)Victory occurs in a colonial war when one side wins the 
hearts and minds of the .. people. 
2)Victory is the,'cessation of armed conflict under 
conditions satisfactory to at least one of the combatants 
in terms of stated objectives.' 
3)Victory involves the creation of a relationship between 
two parties,with one gaining superiority over the other. 
Termination Points 
4)The loss of a capital city or other major asset indicates 
the ending of a war. 
5JA qualitative shift on the battlefield renders the 





6)Successive battlefield defeats and high casualties 
indicate the ending of a war. 
De-escalation 
?)De-escalation occurs because of military setbacks or the 
pressure from public opinion. 
Public Opinion and Prolongation of War 
8)War termination is delayed because public opinion will 
not permit the ending of war. 
9)War termination is delayed because of the conflict 
between'hawks' and 'doves.' 
Re-orientation 
lO)Reoriention occurs because of'war weariness. 
ll)Re-orientation involves a change of regime. 
ceasefires and Peacemaking 
12)Successful peace talks require common areas of interest 
on which agreement can be reached. 
13)Diplomats use a variety of tools and techniques to reach 
peace agreements.These tools are useless if the political 
will to terminate a war does not exist from the outset. 
14)Durable peace occurs when all sides are content with the 
political and military outcome of a war. 
We will now test these premises against the reality of 
four case studies to see whether they stand up or need 




these premises we have to examine the aims and strategies 
of the belligerents involved in these wars. 
29 
Chapter Two 
counterinsurgency and Revolutionary Warfare 
This chapter is designed with the lay reader in mind 
rather than the expert,for without a review of the aims and 
methods of the belligerents,the reader risks being lost in 
a world of unfamiliar places, people, ideologies and 
military strategies.First of all we will examine the 
Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategies of France,Britain and 
the Portuguese.Then we will analyse the Revolutionary 
Warfare strategies of the Vietminh,the FLN (National 
Liberation Front), the MCP (Malayan Communist Party) and 
Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique). 
Strategies of the Colonial Powers 
Our analysis of COIN is based upon the approach used 
by John Baylis when he examined COIN and Revolutionary 
Warfare.He divided COIN into a number of different 
dimensions:military;socio-economic;political and 
psychological. 55 
The Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategies of France, 
Britain and Portugal had much in common.Each colonial power 
aimed to defeat the internal aggression in their respective 
colonies and win over the colonial citizens to their 
cause.As will be seen in our discussion of the O'Connor and 
Carroll theories,the colonial powers had varying degree of 
success. 
55 J.Baylis,'Counter-Insurgency Warfare,'in Baylis et 
al,Contemporary Strategic Thought,(London:Croom 
Helm,Second Edition,1987.) 
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The respective military operations of the three 
colonial powers were similar .All used local recruits in 
their struggle against guerrilla forces.Colonial troops had 
three main roles.First they had to guard protected 
villages,army outposts and communication links from 
guerrilla attacks.Second,troops conducted offensive sweeps 
against guerrilla forces.The aims of these offensive 
operations were to destroy guerrilla bases,capture rebel 
commanders and locate and capture enemy weapons.The third 
task was to gather military intelligence about rebel 
positions, combat strength,location of bases and arms 
caches.The French in their campaign against the Vietminh 
and the Portuguese in their struggle against Frelimo placed 
more emphasis on the military aspect of COIN than their 
British counterparts in Malaya. 
The socio-economic aspects of COIN had several 
components. First the colonial powers set up walled 
villages.Second,the colonial powers increased spending on 
education and welfare .All three powers regrouped people 
into walled villages to protect villagers from attacks by 
insurgent forces.The colonial powers increased spending on 
education and welfare,in the hope that reforms would 
attract people to their cause. 
Portugal for example moved people into aldeamentos,or 
walled villages. The aim was to starve the guerrillas of 
local support.Situated by roads,making them easy to supply 
and reinforce if attacked, the camps were 




'concentration camps' a pejorative term difficult for the 
regime to brush aside. In theory, the aldeamentos were to 
provide amenities such as health care, education, regular 
food and water supplies and protection from guerrilla 
attacks and coercion. 56 By 1973, the Portuguese commander in 
Mozambique,General Arriaga boasted that over 1 million 
people were living in aldeamentos. 0 
The third dimension was political.All three colonial 
powers tried to cultivate political parties in the hope 
that these could undercut nationalist support.Early in the 
Malayan Emergency,the British sponsore~ a rival national 
party to the MCP.Ideally,this new party would oppose the 
MCP, foster good relations with the Malays,recognise 
British law and policy, and finally recognise 'the 
connection between the morale of local Chinese society and 
internal security. ' 58 This resulted in the Malay Chinese 
Association being formed during December 1948. 59 The 
political aspect of French c,oIN in the Indochinese war 
became known as the Bao Dai· solution,which was a French 
attempt to set up Emperor Bao Dai as a rival to the 
56 A.Isaacman and B.Isaacman,Mozambigue:Colonialism to 
Revolution,1900-1982,(Boulder Colorado:Westview Press, 
1983),pp.lOO-lOl;T.H.Henriksen,Mozambigue: A History, 
(London:Collings,1978),pp.193-195;and B.F.Jundanian, 
'Resettlement Programs: Counterinsurgency in Mozambique, ' 
Comparative Politics,Vol.6(4),July 1974,pp.522-525. 
57 The Times, 30 July 1973. 




Communist Ho Chi Minh. 
The fourth dimension of COIN involved psychological 
warfare.In Algeria for example,the French created 
'Psychological Action Bureaux' to make French soldiers 
immune to revolutionary propaganda,and to distribute French 
propaganda leaflets to Muslim people. 6° From April to July 
1956 the French stepped up their psychological warfare 
activities,with the creation of the Psychological Action 
and Information Service (SAPI) in April and in July the 
first four operational companies of SAPI who were given 
names such as Leaflet and Loudspeaker were ready for 
service.Also in July 1956,the army published its own 
psychological warfare pamphlet. 61 Colonel Jules Roy, a 
Frenchman touring Algeria records that the posters 
extolling the virtues of French democracy and liberty were 
, , 62 
to be seen everywhere from billboards to road signs. 
The French and Portuguese conducted similar COIN 
strategies to the British,yet they failed to win the hearts 
and minds of their colonial inhabitants.Britain differed 
from France and Portugal in one major respect.The British 
were willing to concede independence relatively early on 
during their campaign against the MCP. 
The British success in Malaya contrasts starkly with 
60 ibid,pp.184-185.Psychological Bureaux officers were 
distributed down to battalion level. 
61 E.O'Ballance,The Algerian Insurrection 1954-62,(London: 
Faber and Faber,1967),pp.78-79. 
62 J.Roy,La Guerre D'Algerie,(Paris:Rene Juillard, 
1960) ,p.24. 
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the failure of French and Portuguese COIN.France and 
Portugal wanted to defeat internal aggression and retain 
their colonial possessions at the same time.This internal 
contradiction was their Achilles heel.Given the choice of 
independence or psuedo-independence many of the colonial 
inhabitants opted for self rule. 
Revolutionary Warfare Strategies 
The four insurgent movements attempts to win the 
hearts and minds of their compatriots had several 
aspects .Propaganda was filled with attacks on unpopular 
practices such as taxation and landlords who charged too 
much rent. This local aspect was broadened by propaganda 
against colonialism.The revolutionary movements discussed 
in this thesis fused local grievances and national 
grievances into a powerful crusade against colonialism.The 
insurgent movements' principal attraction lay in their 
vision of an independent,egalitarian,democratic and 
economically prosperous society, and this utopian vision 
gave the Vietminh,the FLN and Frelimo a decisive edge over 
the French and the Portuguese colonial powers,who,for 
domestic reasons,were reluctant to grant independence. 
The four insurgent movements examined in this thesis 
had one paramount aim:they wanted to gain independence.In 
addition,all the four movements were prepared to fight for 
their freedom. 
The Vietminh and the MCP were both Communist.The MCP 
fought for the creation of an independent Communist state, 
34 
the same objective of the Vietminh in French Indochina,led 
by Ho Chi Minh.The MCP,Frelimo and the Vietminh also wanted 
to abolish feudalism in their countries.All wanted to end 
the powers of tribal chiefs and redistribute land to the 
peasant farmers. 
None of the revolutionary movements were democratic in 
the Western sense of the term. In the newly independent 
countries,the movement which won the military struggle 
against the colonial power would have the dominant 
political voice.The Frelimo leadership for exampleleaders 
saw to it that their party would be the sole political 
party,although all citizens would have a role in decision-
making through a system of direct democracy at villag_e, 
cooperative and district levels. 63 The lack of a democratic 
leadership may have been due to the pre-emomence of the 
military in the liberation movements.For example,in Algeria 
and Mozambique,the revolutionary army would be central to 
the transformation of society and the process of nation 
building. 64 
Political parties which refused to accept the 
leadership of the revolutionaries were usually eliminated. 
The Vietminh for example,had no qualms about killing rival 
political leaders who stood in their way. In his memoirs 
General Giap refers to "groups in Hanoi [who] had the task 
63 Eduardo Mondlane,The Struggle for Mozambigue,(London: 
Zed Books,1983),pp.163-196. 
64 Machel,S.'The Peoples' Democratic Revolutionary Process 
in Mozambique,'in Munslow,B.(ed).Samora Nachel:African 




of suppressing reactionaries" -which is clearly a euphemism 
for killing opponents.~ 
The insurgent military strategies of the Vietminh,the 
FLN, the MCP and Frelimo shared may things in common. The 
military strategies used by the four independence movements 
were based upon Mao Tse Tung' s theory of revolutionary 
warfare.It will be recalled that Mao's theory of 
revolutionary warfare had three stages.There is the 
defensive phase involving hit and run operations,setting up 
a secure rear base area.The next stage is the strategic 
stalemate,where the aim is to 'expand cell structures in 
inkblot-like fashion'across the country.Finally there is 
the strategic counteroffensive,the conventional phase of 
the war. 66 
Each of the independence movements adapted Mao's ideas 
to their respective countries.The MCP strategy was similar 
to Mao' s three stages, al though there was a major 
difference.Whereas Mao concentrated his efforts on Chinese 
peasants,the MCP concentrated its efforts to win landless 
Chinese labourers on the rubber plantations to the MCP 
cause. Accordingly, the MCP three phase strategy was the 
following:first,attack isolated tin mines and rubber 
plantations. Second, set up liberated areas. Third, attack town 
65 Vo Nguyen Giap,Unforgettable Months and Years.Translated 
by Mai Elliott.Data Paper 99,South East Asian Program, 
(New York:Cornell University Press,1975),p.55. 
66 Baylis, p. 218. 
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and cities with conventional forces.~ As will be seen,the 
war never really went beyond the first stage,and the MCP 
eventually lost the war in 1960. 
The Vietminh leaders General Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi 
Minh adapted Mac's ideas to a country with a high 
illiteracy rate, isolated villages and poor communication 
links.~ The Vietminh targeted villages as the most likely 
bases of potential support,and later on we will see that 
the village bases were an resilient bulwark against foreign 
penetration. 
Giap also modified Mao' s strategy, by including an 
additional two phases-known as preparatory phases.The first 
preparatory phase was the psychological warfare 
stage, involving the formation of revolutionary cells, the 
setting up of secure bases and distribution of propaganda. 
Second,there was the small unit phase when army companies 
are farmed, as well as political associations. 69 The three 
remaining stages of Giap's five phase strategy were 
identical to Mac's three revolutionary warfare stages. 
It is difficult to ascertain a date for each stage of 
the Vietminh strategy in the Franco-Indochinese War.Stages 
one and two lasted from August 1945 to December 1946.The 
defensive phase began during December 1946 and lasted upto 
September 1950.The Strategic stalemate began during 
67 E. D. Smith, Counterinsurgency Operations: Malaya and Borneo, 
(London:Ian Allen,1985),p.7. 
68 D.Pike,The Vietcong,(Cambridge MA:MIT Press,1968),p.32. 
69 ibid,p. 36. 
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September 1950 and lasted to the end of the war.As John 
Baylis says,the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was strictly 
speaking not part of a strategic counteroffensive, because 
the battle was only based in one remote part of Tonkin 
Province. 10 
The FLN strategy and tactics were formulated at the 
Soummam Conference in 1956.FLN tactics were closely 
modelled on the ideas of General Giap and Mao Tse Tung. 71 
Ideally,there were to be three phases.The first phase would 
consist of terrorism,hit and run tactics,with the aim of 
seizing ammunition,expansion in the mountain area,and 
winning villages over to the FLN cause.The so called 
'Guerrilla Stage' lasted for twenty months.n 
The second phase of the FLN campaign was the 
protracted war stage.Protracted war began in 1957 with the 
movement of guerrilla activities to urban centres-such as 
Algiers.In addition the FLN gained the usage of Tunisia and 
Morocco as military bases from which to supply forces 
inside Algeria,harass French forces,then retreat into 
supposedly neutral territory.The protracted stage of the 
war lasted until 1959 ,and after that,because the French 
were too strong,the FLN had to revert back to small scale 
terrorist operations.There was no conventional stage in FLN 
strategy,because the FLN were not militarily strong enough 




to launch conventional attacks on colonial forces. 73 
Frelimo's strategy was formulated at the Second 
Congress held in Niassa in July 1968.Frelimo strategy was 
also based on Mao's ideas.The Frelimo leadership had no 
doubt that the war against Portugal would be a protracted 
war. In addition the war would be a Peoples war, with an 
emphasis on gaining the support of the population,rather 
than militarily defeating the Portuguese. Frelimo's 
military strategy thus contrasts with the Vietminh and 
FLN,both of which aimed to inflict a military defeat on the 
colonial power. 
In common with the MCP and the Vietminh,Frelimo aimed 
to set up 'liberated areas,'that is,areas which the 
guerrillas militarily controlled. In the liberated zones 
agricultural cooperatives were to be set up, and for the 
first time rural people were to have authority over their 
own lives,rather than living under the thumb of Lisbon or 
tribal chiefs. 74 
Summary 
The wars examined in this thesis were very similar.All 
stem from a conflict between the old and new,colonialism 
versus independence,feudalism versus modernisation.All 
three colonial powers stood like sand against the wind of 
change blowing through their empires. 
n O'Ballance,p.206. 
74 B.Munslow,Mozambigue:The Revolution and its Origin, 
(London:1983),pp.107-110. 
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We now have to see how far the war termination 
theories can throw light on the outcomes of the four wars 
examined in this thesis.After this general discussion about 
military strategy it is perhaps fitting that the premises 
developed by O'Connor and Carroll about 'Victory' should be 
examined first.Since the colonial powers had to concede 
indepedence,it is appropriate to discuss how and why, 
according to war termination theory,this occurred. 
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Chapter Three 
Karl Von Clausewitz observed that war is politics by 
other means.Politicians decide when to declare war and who 
to attack,leaving their soldiers to fight and die on the 
battlefield.When a war ends it can have three military 
outcomes-victory,defeat and stalemate.The military outcome 
of the war determines whether or not the political 
objectives have been achieved.This chapter will examine one 
of these outcomes-victory. 
Our analysis will be based upon an examination of two 
definitions of the word, 'Victory' postulated by. Raymond 
O'Connor and Berenice Carroll respectively.Accordingly,the 
chapter will be divided into two sections.The first section 
will examine O'Connor's idea.He believed that victory must 
take into account the objectives of the belligerents,with 
reference to the situation at the end of a war.The next 
section will examine Ca~roll's idea of 'Victory'.She 
believed that 'victory' described the relationship between 
two opponents in which one side has gained the upper hand. 
'The cessation of armed conflict under conditions 
satisfactory to at least one of the combatants in terms of 
stated objectives.'(O'Connor) 
Britain's paramount aim in Malaya was to defeat 
Communist Insurgency.The British believed that the only way 
to beat Communist insurgency was to establish strong 
democratic,self governing states in South East Asia,even if 
41 
logically this policy meant the loss of British colonies to 
eventual independence. 75 The British were successful. The 
MCP was defeated.Malaya was granted independence in 1957 
and since then has developed along broadly democratic 
lines.Clearly,in terms of stated objectives,Britain was 
victorious in Malaya. 
Unfortunately O'Connor's idea of victory is difficult 
to apply to the Franco-Indochinese War because of the 
difficulty in deciding who won this war.At one level it 
seems that France was the clear loser.When the war ended in 
1954 she had lost control of most of Tonkin and North 
Annam.Only with the help of two religious groups did she 
manage to hang on to Cochinchina.When looked at in another 
light however, things did not turn out so badly for the 
French. Paul Marie de la Goree has observed that if the 
French had accepted Ho Chi Minh's demands for independence 
in 1946 then the whole of Vietnam would have fallen under 
Communist control.Arguably,since only half of Vietnam lay 
in Communist hands in 1954 France could claim a partial 
victory. 76 
Ironically the Vietminh only partially achieved their 
initial war aims .A Communist republic was set up in the 
Northern Vietnam province of Tonkin and North Annam, but 
Cochinchina remained a separate state(and it would not be 
75 Ritchie Ovendale,The English Speaking 
Alliance,(London:George Allen and Unwin,1985), 
pp.144-152. 




until 1975,that a united Vietnam would be formed.) 77 
Vietminh dissatisfaction with the outcome meant that peace 
in Indo China would be short lived. 
The Algerian case meets O'Connor's criteria of victory 
more easily.France's principal aim from 1954-1960 was to 
protect the French empire against the FLN' s demand for 
independence.France was not defeated on the battlefield.At 
war's end,France controlled all of the cities on the 
Mediterranean coast.However,in 1962 the FLN achieved their 
aim of an independent Algerian state governed by the 
leaders of the FLN.Hence,the war's outcome was satisfactory 
to the FLN. 
O'Connor's definition of victory also seems 
appropriate in the context of the Portuguese war in 
Mozambique.Portugal's central aim was similar to that of 
France in Algeria-the preservation of its empire.In common 
with the Vietminh,the MCP and the FLN,Frelimo wanted to 
remove all vestiges of colonialism.In terms of this stated 
aim,Frelimo achieved its objective with the creation of an 
independent Mozambican state at the Lusaka Peace talks in 
September 1974.Portugal was the clear loser. 
77 Anthony Eden,Full Circle,(London:Cassell, 
1960),pp.140-142;and Robert Randle,Geneva,1954, 
(Princeton,NJ:Princeton University Press,1969), 
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'The Creation of a Relationship between Victor and 
Vanguished' 
The Malayan Emergency 
The British experience in Malaya provides a clear 
example of how a colony's geographical situation can help 
a colonial power fight an insurgency.According to Robert 
Thompson, Britain's biggest advantage was Malaya's relative 
isolation from Communist China and North Vietnam.In 
addition Thailand was hostile to Communism and denied the 
MCP sanctuary. 78 In practice this meant that MCP had no 
genuine secure rear base areas in which to train 
guerrillas.The Thais also helped Britain patrol the Thai-
Malay border.One such operation took place in January 
1953. 79 
Racial di visions in Malayan society also helped the 
British.Apart from European expatriates, there were three 
main racial groups-the Ma lays, the Indians and the 
' 
Chinese.The MCP derived its support mainly from the Chinese 
community,while the Indians and Malayans tended to support 
the colonial power. Indians did not support the MCP and 
Lucian Pye believed this was because the British treated 
the Indian community well-for example,Medicare was provided 
78 Robert Thompson,Defeating Commmunist Insurgency: 
Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam,(London: 
Chatto & Windus,1966),pp.18-20. 
79 John Cloake,Templer:Tiger of Malaya,(London:Harrap, 
1985),p.299. 
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by the Indian Immigration fund. 80 Many Muslim Malays 
refused to support the MCP because of its atheistic 
doctrine. 81 Malayan support for the British was crucial,as 
Short points out: 
'If the insurrection had been supported by the Malay 
community to anything like the extent that it was by the 
Chinese it could not have been won by the British 
forces• 182 
The Chinese community comprised about 40% of the total 
Malayan population, but it seems that only the Chinese 
squatter community supported the MCP. 83 According to Short 
the Chinese felt alienated from society because of the 
reluctance of many Malayan rulers to confer full 
citizenship rights to them. 84 Stubbs cites Malay leaders in 
Kedah and Perak as saying that Chinese citizenship would 
mean the 'delivery of Malaya to the Chinese.' 85 
The British thus enjoyed a large advantage.Only a 
relatively small section of the Chinese squatter community 
actually supported the MCP.Chinese grievances were economic 
and social, and the bulk of British COIN was devoted to 
alleviating them.Finally,Malay and Indian support for 
80 Lucian Pye,Guerrilla communism in Malaya, 









Britain was vital and meant that the MCP could not truly 
claim to be a national party,unlike Frelimo or the FLN for 
instance. 
The third reason for British success was the British 
cultivation of a rival national party to the MCP.Early in 
the Emergency the British recognised the need for a third 
force to rival the Communists.During 1948 the High 
Commissioner,Henry Gurney,tried to set up a Chinese party 
to rival the MCP. Ideally,this new party would oppose the 
MCP, foster good relations with the Malays,recognise 
British law and policy and finally recognise 'the 
connection between the morale of local Chinese society and 
internal security. 186 This resulted in the Malay Chinese 
Association being formed during December 1948. 87 The 
British also involved colonial citizens at cabinet level 
and this change took place in March 1951,when the British 
Governor of Malaya,Henry Gurney,set up a cabinet 
administration out of the colony's Executive Council.The 
cabinet included senior locals such as Dato Onn,who became 
Home Affairs Minister,and Tunku Yaacab,the brother of Tunku 
Rahman ,Malaysia's first Prime Minister. 88 General Templer 
speeded the localisation process.By the time he left Malaya 
at the end of 1954 five Malayan political leaders were 
serving in the Federal War Executive Council. 89 
86 Short,p. 262. 
n ibid,pp.266-267. 
88 Miller, p .103. 
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a clear victor/ 
the following 
reasons:Malaya's relative isolation from friendly Communist 
states ;the narrow base of support for the MCP ;and the 
fostering of a rival nationalist party.The British 
experience in Malaya is markedly different from similar 
colonial wars fought in Algeria,Indochina and Mozambique, 
where the French and Portuguese generally fought a 
multiracial opposition,lacked a strong third force and were 
surrounded by hostile states which tended to offer 
4sanctuary to insurgent forces. 
The French War in Indo-China 
Carroll's idea of victory is not easily applied to the 
Franco-Indochinese War because neither France nor the 
Vietminh emerged as clear victors in the military sense of 
the term.Instead,the result was a partial victory for both 
sides.At wars end France held Cochinchina whilst the 
Vietminh held Tonkin and parts of Annam.The creation of of 
a fudged relationship between partial victors was due to 
the following reasons.First,the Vietminh managed to fuse 
peasant grievances into a crusade against the colonial 
regime.Second,the Vietminh played upon peasant 
superstitions.Third,they ruthlessly suppressed rival 
opposition groups.The principal reason for French success 
in Cochinchina was that France had the support of two 
47 
indigenous political groups called the Cao Dai and the Hoa 
Hao. 
In North Vietnam the Vietminh exploited the widespread 
peasant grievances against the colonial regime. In 1946 
there were many peasant grievances.Heavy taxation and high 
rents were hated.Peasants did not like to pay tax to Hanoi 
or Saigon.Absentee landlords,especially those in the 
north,were hated,because they set high rents. 90 
Not surprisingly the Vietminh targeted the villagers 
as potential bases of support. 91 When the French flushed 
the Vietminh out of the cities into the countryside from 
December 1946 to March 1947 ,the Vietminh set up workers 
cells and peasant committees in villages in Tonkin and 
Central Annam. 92 The proliferation of Vietminh controlled 
villages after March 1947,gave the Vietminh a strong 
political base-chiefly in Tonkin. 93 
The Vietminh successfully played upon peasant 
superstitions,in particular the concept of the 'mandate of 
heaven.' This concept means that rulers can only govern if 
they have the consent of heaven or God.Once God has removed 
his mandate then the old order falls and a new one starts. 
This idea was relevant to developments in post-war 
90 Alexander Woodside,Community and Revolution in 
Modern Vietnam,(Boston:Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1976),pp.156-157;and John.T.McAlister and Paul 
Mus,The Vietnamese and their Revolution,(New York 
and London:Harper Torchbooks,1970),pp.120-121. 
91 McAlister and Mus, p .138; and Pike, p. 4 7. 
~ Pike,p.47;and Kelly,p.82. 
93 McAlister and Mus,p.51,111-113. 
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Indochina. World War Two shattered the colonial myth for 
good.An Asian power,Japan,had demonstrated the weakness of 
the Western colonial powers,Britain,France and the 
Netherlands. Western powers, from a peasant point of view, 
were like defeated gods,no longer a worthy focus for Asian 
loyalties. 94 In September 1945 Ho Chi Minh proclaimed 
Vietnamese independence.The old Emperor Bao Dai abdicated 
and for a time joined the new government. From a peasant 
viewpoint the abdication of the Confucian Emperor(symbol of 
the old order) suggested that the Mandate of Heaven had 
shifted from France to the Vietnamese. 95 
Finally, the Vietminh were more ruthless than their 
opponents,and they had no qualms about killing political 
leaders who stood in their way.The entire Trotskyite 
leadership was eliminated by the Vietminh.In October 1946,a 
rival group called the Dong Minh Hoi were eradicated.The 
leader of the Constitutional and National Independence 
Party was murdered,so too was the leader of the Pro-French 
Tonkin Party. 96 Ngho Dinh Khoi, the brother of the future 
President Diem,was assassinated as well. 97 
Yet the Vietminh remained weak in Cochinchina,which is 
why the Vietminh only partially achieved their aims. 
Vietminh weakness allowed France to emerge as a partial 
94 McAlister and Mus,pp.59-69. 
95 Short,A.The Origins of the Vietnam War,(London and 
New York,1989),pp.41-45. 
96 Pike,p.44. 
97 B.Fall,Street Without Joy,(London:Pall Mall 
Press,1963),p.27. 
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victor in the war.Vietminh weakness in Cochinchina was a 
consequence of competing with three other groups for the 
hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people-the French,and 
two religious groups,the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao.These last two 
groups had a great deal of support amongst peasant 
villagers. 98 
The Hoa Hao were a Buddhist group who offered 
salvation to its followers.Peasants supported the utopian 
vision of the movement,and since it aimed to fight foreign 
aggressors,the Hoa Hao could also claim to be a bone-fide 
nationalist group. 99 The Cao Dai supported a revival of 
Confucian values which they believed were being eroded by 
Western values . 100 Since these two religious groups hated 
the Vietminh more than they hated the French,they joined 
the colonial power,giving France a decisive edge over the 
Vietminh below the thirteenth parallel. 101 
Peasant grievances, a secure rear base area and the 
ruthless elimination of opponents allowed the Vietminh to 
emerge as partial victors.Conversely France was strong in 
Cochinchina mainly because she was helped by two indigenous 




101 Scholl-Latour ,p. 33. 
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The Franco-Algerian War 
Carroll's idea of 'Victory' can be applied to the 
Algerian War.By war's end in 1962,a peculiar situation 
arose whereby France,who was the military victor,conceded 
independence to the FLN.In fact France conceded 
independence for domestic political reasons,and these 
reasons will be discussed later on in Chapter Nine which 
specifically deals with War Termination and Domestic 
Politics.This section,however,only deals with the military 
aspects of war termination.There were three reasons for the 
French military victory. 
Over a period of five years from 1954-1959 France 
developed and slowly perfected an Coin strategy known as 
'Quadrillage.' This strategy required thousands of men to 
undertake surveillance duty. The quadrillage strategy 
created a huge security blanket across Algeria.This was the 
strategy's chief strength,and FLN activities were greatly 
hindered as a result. 
However the quadrillage strategy had one serious 
weakness, which was eventually rectified by De Gaulle. It 
tied down thousands of men in defensive roles, at 
considerable cost to offensive operations.Horne believes 
that only 15,000 men(out of over 400,000) were assigned to 
offensive operations against the FLN.The quadrillage 
strategy was too slow and sluggish to deal effective blows 
against a mobile, elusive enemy. 102 
The French solved this problem in 1959 by implementing 
102 Horne ,p. 331-332 ;and O'Ballance, p.131. 
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what is known as the 'Challe plan' after its namesake 
General Maurice Challe . 103 It seems that the main aim of 
the Challe Plan was to make sure that,'the FLN could not 
inflict on the French a military reversal significant 
enough to impinge on diplomatic negotiations'-which is what 
happened at Dien Bien Phu,the decisive battle in the 
Indochina War. 10" Militarily the Challe plan was a 
success.The FLN was forced to operate with smaller 
companies of men rather than whole battalions.The FLN was 
believed to have lost about 15000 men during operations in 
the latter half of 1959 .Morale was low in FLN ranks, 
illustrated by some men's refusal to cross the Morice line 
from Tunisia to Algeria because it was too dangerous. 105 
A second reason for the French military success was 
the construction of a line of border defences which became 
known as the 'Morice line of defences' after the French 
commander in charge of the operation.The Morice Line 
hindered FLN activities in Algeria and prevented a 
conventional phase of FLN strategy,because the wall 
blockaded over ten thousand FLN soldiers in Tunisia for 
most of the war and hindered the supply of FLN guerrillas 
inside Algeria . 106 The wall effectively cut off contact 
between Tunisia and Algeria. 107 On many occasions the FLN 
1 ro Talbott,p.145;and Horne,p.569. 
10
" Talbott, p .145. 
105 O'Ballance,pp.135-137. 
1
~ Horne,pp.263-265;and O'Ballance,p.120. 
107 Kelly, p .158. 
' 
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tried and failed to breach to the Morice Line. ws 
Third,the French managed to drive the FLN out of major 
cities.In February 1957 French trooops forced the FLN to 
evacuate Algiers. In a bloody two month campaign in the 
Algerian capital city the FLN suffered at least three 
thousand 
weakened 
fatalities . 109 
the FLN.Its 
Defeat in Algiers seriously 
political arm,the OPA was 
destroyed,and the FLN Command Council,the CCE, was forced 
to evacuate to Tunisia . 110 Terrorist incidents lessened. 111 
The Portuguese War in Mozambigue 
The most accurate description of Portugal's position 
is that of military deterioration rather than outright 
defeat.In one sense then,Carroll's idea of 'victory' is 
inappropriate. Yet it is still necessary to examine the 
reasons for the war's outcome.There were several long term 
factors which were responsible for Portugal's deteriorating 
' position in 1974.We will discuss Frelimo's success at 
winning the hearts and minds in Chapter Four.Other 
important factors were:the failure of the political and 
social dimension of Portuguese COIN,the spread of Frelimo 
liberated areas,Portugal's failure to contain the rebels 
and Frelimo sanctuaries in the bordering states of Zambia 
1
~ Horne,pp.253-254. 
109 Horne, p. 202. 




In Chapter Two,(pp.29-33) we saw that Portugal adopted 
a similar COIN strategy to the British in Malaya. We saw 
that there were several dimensions to the Portuguese 
campaign: military;socio-economic;and political.Portugal 
spent money on infrastructure such as the Cabora Bassa Dam 
and regrouped people in 'aldeamentos' or walled villages. 
However, the socio-economic and political aspects of the 
Portuguese campaign suffered many drawbacks.The aldeamentos 
fell short of idealistic expectations.Amenities such as 
adequate food and water supplies and fertile land were in 
short supply in some villages. 112 Frelimo guerrillas 
managed to penetrate the villages and some villagers acted 
as rebel informers. 113 
It is quite probable that atrocities by Portuguese 
soldiers also discredited the Portuguese cause. The most 
infamous atrocity was the Wiryamu massacre of 16th December 
1972,when 400 people were murdered. 114 Black Mozambicans 
disliked the way in which the perpetrators of the Wiryamu 
Massacre of December 1972 were let off so lightly without 
even prison sentences.us 
The most glaring failure of Portuguese COIN was the 




3 ibid,p. 519. 
114 Henriksen,Revolution and Counterrevolution,p.135. 
us The unit's commander was dismissed. 
Henriksen,Revolution and counterrevolution, 
p.133,139. 
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expounded by Frelimo.In contrast to the British sponsorship 
of rival nationalist groups during the Malayan 
Emergency,Portugal made little attempt to seek the support 
of rival nationalist parties.Portugal only belatedly 
decided to foster the support of an alternative nationalist 
party.In 1974 Portugal allowed the Grupo Unido do 
Mozambique(or GUMO) to participate in elections,but GUMO 
arrived too late on the political landscape to be effective 
because it had no chance to develop grass roots 
suppport . 116 Portugal did not off er the prospect of a 
new,more democratic,more egalitarian society-just watered 
down colonialism.Small wonder then,that many blacks refused 
to support the colonial power. 
The failure of the Portuguese COIN greatly helped 
Frelimo to set up 'liberated zones' in areas where 
Portuguese control was weak.These areas tended to be in the 
northern provinces of Niassa,Cabo-Delgado and Tete.The 
'liberated zones' were important because they acted as 
forward bases from which to attack the Portuguese-it was 
from Tete,for instance,that the rebels launched their first 
attacks into Central Mozambique in July 1972 .Liberated 
zones also enabled the guerrillas to form an embryonic 
Mozambican state based on equality and justice . 117 This 
gave a degree of legitimacy to the guerrillas' cause,which 
they would not have gained if the rebels were based 
116 Henriksen,Revolution and Counterrevolution, 
p.101,110. 
117 Mondlane,The Struggle for Mozambigue,pp.191-2. 
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exclusively in Tanzania and Zambia.Within the liberated 
areas the guerrillas could offer the prospect of a new 
society-something which the Portuguese could not do without 
jeopardising the regime in Portugal. 
Finally,the Frelimo campaign was greatly helped by the 
sanctuary offered by 





training camps for Frelimo. 119 Eduardo Mondlane admitted 
that Frelimo had training camps at the Tanzanian village of 
Bagamoyo. 120 According to Le Monde, Tanzania was the base 
from which Frelimo launched its campaign into Cabe Delgado 
in September and October 19 6 4 . 121 
Henriksen regards the Portuguese failure to attack 
guerrilla bases in Tanzania as a fatal error. 122 However, 
attacking Tanzania and Zambia would have escalated a 
colonial war to an interstate war in Africa with dangerous 
consequences for Portuguese relations with African and 
Western states.In addition,resources would have been 
stretched since as well as fighting wars in Angola and 
Guinea Bissau,another opponent would have had to be 
112 Colin Legum,'The End of the last Western Colonial 
Empire,'Current Affairs Bulletin,Vol.51, No.3, 
August 1974,p.9. 
119 R.D'A Henderson,'Relations of Neighbourliness,' 
Journal of Modern African Studies,Vol.15, 
No.3,1977,p.441. 
120 Mondlane,The Struggle for Mozambigue,p.128. 
121 Le Monde, 10th and 23rd October, 1964 





fought.There was also the danger of a more active 
involvement by China and Russia. Thus escalation to reverse 
a worsening military situation would have been extremely 
risky to Lisbon. 
Summary 
O'Connor's defined 'victory' as the attainment of 
political objectives with reference to the situation at 
war's end.His idea seems applicable to the cases.Britain 
defeated the MCP in 1960 .The Inda-Chinese war ended in 
stalemate in 1954 with the Vietminh and France both 
partially achieving their objectives.Algeria gained 
independence in 1962.Frelimo's desire for an independent 
Mozambican state was attained in 1974. 
Berenice Carroll's idea of 'Victory' as the 
relationship between victor and vanquished,seems applicable 
to Malaya,Algeria and Mozambique.The British emerged as the 
victors in Malaya and wiped out the MCP. France and the 
Vietminh were partial victors in the Inda-Chinese war. 
France emerged as the military victor in Algeria but the 
FLN secured a political victory as seen by the attainment 
of independence.In Mozambique Frelimo beat the Portuguese. 
We also found that secure rear-base areas,external support, 
and a sound military strategy pave the way to victory in a 
colonial war. 
However,Carroll's idea of victory is too permissive, 
fails to explain why victory occurs and ignores the partial 
attainment of aims.Therefore,a new definition of victory 
r 
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containing military and political elements seems necessary. 
Military victory includes the capture of major strategic 
assets,the destruction of an opponents economic 
infrastructure, territorial conquest,and the infliction of 
massive casualties. Political 'victory' includes the 
attainment of independence,the right of secession and 
removing an opponent's government from office.The final 
outcome of a war can be measured by comparing the military 
and political objectives of the belligerents at the 





This chapter examines the idea of 'Victory' as a 
'process' by focusing on an idea suggested by Raymond 
G.O'Connor.He argued that the side which wins the hearts 
and minds of a population will win a war of liberation.The 
purpose of this chapter is to test his idea against the 
reality of our four case studies. 
Testing O'Connors idea about hearts and minds is not 
an easy task because we are dealing with a psychological 
rather than a physical dimension.We have solved this 
problem by looking at quantifiable or observable behaviour 
which are techniques used by educational psychologists to 
measure the success or failure of an education policy. 
We will look at the following types of observable 
behaviour:the number of military incidents in a particular 
area,the scale of the violence,the geographical extent of 
the war,casualty figures and desertion rates (when 
available) and the numbers of villages under colonial or 
insurgent control. These types of behaviour allow us to 
paint a detailed picture of events. 
Victory occurs in a colonial war when one side wins the 
hearts and minds of the people.(O'Connor) 
Figures released by the British government show that 
in the Malayan Emergency there were widespread surrenders 
of MCP guerrillas from 1957-60,indicating demoralisation in 




disillusioned with the cause and believed that their 
comrades were dying for nothing.Some hated the rigours of 
Communist life and particularly the self criticism. 
Moreover,the Malayan government offered generous surrender 
terms and considerable financial rewards •123 
The most notable MCP leader who surrendered was Hor 
Lung,the Johore State Secretary who turned himself in on 
5th April 1958.He had several reasons for doing so.Malaya 
was now an independent state,and the MCP was now fighting 
against a legally elected government.He recognised that the 
people wanted peace and an improvement in their living 
conditions.Hor Lung eventually persuaded 160 guerrillas to 
surrender and he was awarded $24 7, OOO for his pains •124 
If one looks at the battle casualties between 1952 and 
1954 it is also clear that the British had gained the upper 
hand and were on the road to victory-although,admittedly, 
that was still six years away.In 1952,two hundred and sixty 
three members of the Security forces were killed by the 
MCP,with a further 92 killed in 1953 and 87 in 1954. 125 MCP 
2losses for the same period were significantly higher:1,535 
killed in 1952, 1,404 in 1953 and 985 in 1954 . 126 
Clutterbuck estimated that about two thirds of the MCP had 
123 R. Clutterbuck, The Long. Long War, (London: Cassell, 
2nd Edition,1967),pp.96-107. 
124 R. Stubbs , Hearts and Minds in Gu err i 11 a Warf are , 
(Singapore:Graham Brash,1989),pp.252-54. 






been eliminated by the time Templer left in 1954. Not 
surprisingly,the number of terrorist incidents dropped 
throughout the period as well,from 500 per month in 1952,to 
100 a month in 1954 . 127 
Further evidence of the British success were the first 
appearance of 'white areas' so called because they were 
deemed free from Communist activity. Part of Malacca was 
declared 'white' in September 1953 . 128 By June 1954 about 
1.3 million Malayan citizens lived in 'white' areas. 129 
Indeed,by 1955 about 50% of the Malayan population lived in 
areas outside Communist influence and control . 130 
The picture that emerges is one in which the colonial 
power won over a large number of citizens to its cause.The 
appearance of the white areas and the reduction of 
guerrilla attacks clearly indicate British success.Far from 
progressively losing control in the later stages of the 
insurgency the British were regaining their footholds.This 
state of affairs contrasts with the French and Portuguese 
experiences. 
In the French Indo-Chinese War,the Vietminh were 
successful at winning people over to their cause.The first 
indication of this can be seen in the rising number of 
recruits to the Communist Party during the period 1945 to 
1949.Figures for Communist Party membership are as follows: 
127 ibid,p.186. 
128 Short , p. 3 7 8 . 
129 Stubbs, pp .179-180. 
130 Short , p. 3 7 9 . 
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5,000 in August 1945,20;000 by the end of 1946,rising to 
50,000 by the end of 1947,jumping to 180,000 by the end of 
1948 and soaring to 700,000 by the end of 1949. Gabriel 
Kolko estimated that about one third of the membership was 
based in Cochinchina. in 
The second Vietminh success can be seen in the number 
of villages which they controlled.Buttinger estimated that 
by 1952 the Communists controlled just under a quarter of 
the villages in the Red River Del ta. 1.32 By the middle of 
1953 the Vietminh had further tightened their grip on the 
Tonkinese villages,controlling five thousand villages and 
hamlets in the Red River Del ta. l.33 This represented a 
massive power shift from the French to the Vietminh. 
The next indicator of Vietminh success can be seen in 
the geographical scope of the military violence.In December 
1952 the Vietminh edged nearer to Laos,and on 9th April 
1953 they entered Laos. 1.3 ' By the end of April 1953 
insurgent forces reached the outskirts of the Laotian 
capital city of Luang Prabang. 1.35 
Peter Scholl-Latour observed that by mid 1954 the 
Vietminh were operating in battalion strength and moving 
1.
3
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2nd edition 1994),p.46. 
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around by day rather than night.His observation is 
significant because it meant that the Vietminh could 
operate at battalion level by day in Tonkin.This would have 
been difficult without village support. 136 
The scale of the violence also suggests that the 
Vietminh won large numbers of people over to their 
cause.During 1951 to 1954 the Vietminh launched large-scale 
military operations against the French in the provinces of 
Tonkin and Central Annam.The best known example was their 
attack on the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in which the 
Vietminh used heavy artillery for the assault.Over 200,000 
Vietnamese peasants assisted the Vietminh in their attack 
on Dien Bien Phu.These people were were promised land in 
return. 137 
The Vietminh won the hearts and minds of many of the 
inhabitants in Tonkin. Village support and the growth in 
Communist Party membership enabled the insurgents to move 
freely in northern Vietnam and extend the violence into 
neighbouring Laos.The successful hearts and minds campaign 
in the north was reflected in the political outcome of the 
war. 
Unfortunately,we cannot firmly conclude which side won 
the hearts and minds in the Franco-Algerian War.Both sides 
could reasonably claim some success in their campaigns.We 
will deal with French COIN first. 





In Chapter Two(p.29) it was pointed out that France 
used walled villages to protect Algerians from FLN 
terrorism and provide basic amenities such as food,shelter 
and schooling. If one judges success by the numbers of 
Algerians housed in walled villages then one could say that 
France was fairly successful in winning the hearts and 
minds of the Algerian people.For example,Alistair Horne 
claimed that by July 1959 over one million people had been 
regrouped into walled villages . 138 
A good example of successful regroupment was the town 
of Sidi Salem.Here,houses were built of brick and stone and 
food supplies came regularly .Moreover ,Algerians volunteered 
to live in the town and from 1956 to 1958 its population 
rose from 11,500 to 17,000. Terrorist attacks in the area 
near the town dropped from 186 attacks in 1956 to a mere 80 
in 1958. Unfortunately for the French,Sidi Salem was the 
exception rather than the norm. 139 
Colonel Jules Roy concluded that in general French 
efforts to regroup people into walled villages alienated 
people instead of winning them over.This was because many 
Algerians were forcibly removed from ancient tribal 
homelands.Thousands chose voluntary exile in Tunisia and 
Morocco in order to avoid being regrouped. 140 
Poor conditions inside the camps probably cost the 
French much support and goodwill. Inadequate sanitation, 
138 Horne, p. 3 3 8 • 




disease,barbed wire fences,income controls and travel 
limitations all contributed to the 'concentration camp' 
atmosphere. 141 Like birds in a cage the camp inhabitants 
may have been safe from attack,but they were not spared the 
ravages of disease nor were they free. 
If a situation arises whereby an insurgent force has 
the military and logistical capability to attack a variety 
of targets in different areas,one can reasonably surmise 
that guerrilla forces have the support of the populace.The 
best example of this in Algeria was the Battle of Algiers 
in 1957,which began inJanuary and ended six months later. 
The FLN had several motives for attacking the capital of 
the French colony,but the two main ones were the desire to 
boost popular support with a dramatic military success and 
the desire to sow chaos in the heart of the French command 
structure. 142 
The French response was swift and brutal.By torturing 
suspected terrorists and aided by fifteen hundred informers 
the French quickly gained an accurate picture of the FLN 
command structure. Six months after the FLN began their 
assual t the violence stopped. 143 Algiers was quiet 
afterwards with a large reduction in terrorist incidents 
beginning in October 1957 and lasting through to December 
141 Heggoy,pp.183-4. 
142 G.A.Kelly ,Lost Soldiers:The French Army and Empire in 
Crisis.1947-1962,(Boston:M.I.T.Press,1965),p.191; 
Horne,p.190; and Heggoy,pp.233-44. 
143 Horne,pp.191-4; Talbott,p.85; and O'Ballance,p.80. 
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1960. 144 
Al though the FLN lost the Battle of Algiers, their 
ability to carry the war to the French administrative 
capital suggests that many Algerians supported or at least 
sympathised with the FLN. In addition, it is quite likely 
that French heavy-handedness alienated many potential 
supporters and drove them into the welcoming arms of the 
insurgents. 
Both the FLN and France could claim success in their 
respective hearts and minds campaigns.The FLN's ability to 
launch attacks in Algiers suggests that Algerians living 
there had been won over to the FLN's cause.The crass heavy-
handedness of French regroupment policy angered 
Algerians,causing many to support the FLN or flee abroad to 
Tunisia and Morocco.The French could claim that one million 
people had been moved into walled villages and couid also 
claim that after the Battle of Algiers there was a major 
reduction in FLN attacks in Algiers and towns such as Oran. 
O'Connor's emphasis on the importance of winning the 
hearts and minds in a colonial war is supported by events 
in the Portuguese war in Mozambique. Analysis of the scope 
of the war,numbers of military incidents and the scale of 
the violence show that Frelimo was successful in winning 
popular support. 
Frelimo relentlessly extended its guerrilla operations 
as the war progressed.In 1964 war broke out in the two 
northern provinces of Niassa and Caba Delgado. By 1969 
144 Talbott, p. 88. 
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Frelimo attacks were spreading westwards into the province 
of Tete.Three years later,in July 1972,Frelimo moved south, 
despatching guerrilla units into the Central Mozambican 
provinces of Manica and Sofala.By the middle of 1974 
Frelimo was attacking the Beira railway link to Rhodesia 
and beginning to move units into Zambezia.The widening 
scope of the war clearly indicates that Frelimo managed to 
politicise people in villages across the entire country. 145 
Friendly villages provided Frelimo with an ever increasing 
number of sanctuaries and bases to train in,together with 
a steady supply of recruits to the cause,places to store 
weapons and forward bases from which to attack other 
provinces. 
Another type of observable behaviour which indicates 
a successful hearts and minds campaign is the increasing 
number of military incidents in a geographical 
area.Although exact details have never been released, 
newspaper reports from 1973 onwards point towards a rise in 
the number of guerrilla attacks on Portuguese troops. 
In late 1973 Frelimo launched attacks on Portuguese 
communication links in north and central Mozambique. The 
most significant of these occurred on 31st December 1973 
when Frelimo derailed a passenger and goods train at 
Garuso,a hamlet on the Rhodesian border.This incident 
prompted the London Times to note that the attack was the 
first,'on this vital link between Rhodesia and the 
1




Mozambican port of Beira', and that it was,'the farthest 
south that guerrillas have attacked in Mozambique.' 146 
Garuso was 450 miles from Frelimo bases in Tete and 600 
miles from sanctuaries in Cabo Delgado.That an insurgent 
could attack targets hundreds of miles from its rear base 
areas strongly suggests that Frelimo had much popular 
support in Central Mozambique.Moreover,the Garuso attack 
was not an isolated incident;many more attacks followed on 
this stretch of railway from January through to June 1974. 
All this suggests that O'Connor's hearts and minds 
thesis is fairly persuasive. By winning popular support 
Frelimo extended its military range.In 1974 Frelimo attacks 
spread across the country in a bloody crescendo of 
violence,and Portugal's position grew steadily worse.This 
situation might never have arisen if Frelimo was solely 
based in Tanzania or Zambia.It could only have occurred 
with village support. 




O'Connor strongly believed that whoever wins the 
hearts and mind will emerge victorious in an insurgency.His 
view seems to be correct.The promise of independence and 
the implementation of social and economic reforms were the 
critical factors in winning people over to the British 
cause in Malaya, the Vietminh's cause in Indo-China, the 
FLN's campaign in Algeria and Frelimo's struggle in 
Mozambique.The French and Portuguese refusal to offer 
independence resulted in massive losses of local support at 
all levels of society and at the village level in 
particular. 
When a colonial power wins the hearts and minds of a 
population we can expect to see the following results.The 
Guerrilla's violence will decrease and their attacks will 
become less frequent.They will resort to using smaller and 
smaller fighting units.Surrenders and desertion rates 
amongst guerrilla forces will rise,as also will casualty 
rates.In addition they will lose control of villages.This 
vicious circle will eventually lead to the elimination of 
the insurgent. 
Conversely,when an insurgent wins the hearts and minds 
of the people we can expect an increase in the number of 
guerrilla attacks. The violence will spread to outlying 
areas, and insurgents will attack in greater numbers and 
move across their territory by day rather than 
night.Desertion and casualty rates for the colonial power 
will increase. Slowly and inexorably the colonial power will 
r 
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lose control of its colony as the violence spreads from 





War termination theorists have identified three types 
of termination point which indicate that a war is about to 
end.Lewis Coser noted 'symbolic signposts' such as the 
capture of a fortress or capital city.Paul Kecskemeti and 
Johan Galtung identified 'qualitative' shifts on the 
battlefield.Frank Klingberg and John Voevodsky observed 
that if one side suffers a series of battle defeats and 
heavy casualties for two consecutive campaign 
periods,policy makers may decide to terminate a war.This 
chapter will be subdivided into three parts.The first 
examines the ideas of Lewis Coser,the second will look at 
the theories of Kecskemeti and Galtung,and finally the 
ideas of John Voevodsky and Frank Klingberg will be 
analysed. 
The loss of a capital city or other major asset indicates 
the ending of a war.(Coser) 
Lewis Coser argued that 'symbolic signposts' may 
indicate that a war is about to end. Examples of these 
signposts would be the capture of a fortress or a capital 
city .1,7 
There is no evidence in the Malayan Emergency to 
suggest that easer's signposts are a necessary prelude to 
victory.None of the state capitals in Malaya fell to the 
Communist forces.Nor did the British government lose vast 
147 easer, 'The Termination of Conflict, 'p. 350. 
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tracts of land to the Communists. 
The Coser signposts are also very difficult to 
pinpoint in the French wars in Indo-China and Algeria.In 
terms of symbols these wars seemed to be 
stalemated,something obviously untrue of the outcomes.For 
example,at an early stage of the French war in Indo-China 
France lost control of much of Tonkin.In 1950 the French 
lost several key border outposts in north Vietnam-Cao 
Bang,Dong Khe and Langson. 148 Yet Hanoi,the administrative 
capital of Tonkin,remained in French hands throughout the 
duration of the war, and this seems irrelevant to the 
outcome. 
Coser suggested that if a belligerent loses control of 
something which has symbolic importance,then it could be 
said that a termination point has been reached.Arguably,in 
the Franco-Indochinese war,these symbolic values were the 
villages of the Tonkin Delta.These had symbolic value for 
both the French and Vietminh,judging by both sides' 
attempts to win the villagers over to their respective 
causes.By the middle of 1953 the French estimated that 5000 
out of the 7000 villages in the Red River Del ta were 
controlled by the Vietminh. 
Unfortunately,in the case of Algeria,Coser's ideas do 
not apply. The major Algerian cities of Algiers and Oran 
remained in French hands up to the end of the war.We saw in 
Chapter Three (pp. 49-51) that the French army of half a 
million men significarltly reduced the FLN's ability to 
148 Davidson, pp. 65-91, 102; and FaJ,.l~p .""2--g-"JDA 
?J . . 
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carry out offensive operations against French towns and 
villages.This is an important reason why easer's theory is 
inapplicable-the FLN lacked the military capability to 
capture major French administrative centres. 
easer's termination points cannot easily be applied to 
the Mozambican war either.This war ended in September 1974 
but Portugal did not lose any major administrative centres 
to Frelimo.The capital city Lourenco Marques remained in 
Portuguese hands throughout the war's duration. Portugal 
controlled seven of the ten districts in Mozambique which 
were all situated in the south,central and coastal regions 
of the colony,whilst Frelimo dominated the three northern 
administrative districts of Tete,Cabo Delgado and Niassa. 
A gualitative shift on the battlefield renders the outcome 
irreversible and indicates that a war will soon 
end.(Kecskemeti and Galtung) 
Kecskemeti and Galtung both claimed that major 
qualitative shifts on the battlefield herald an ending to 
war.For example,if a state lost an asset such as a capital 
city then a termination point would have been reached.None 
of the colonial powers examined in this thesis lost control 
of their major administrative centres in their 
colonies,so,at one level,Galtung's premise is inapplicable. 
Yet there were qualitative shifts of a different kind which 
will now be discussed. 
In the 
'qualitative 
Malayan Emergency a 










effective military strategy by the British.This strategy 
was the Briggs Plan,which was implemented in June 1950. 
The view that this qualitative shift marked a 
termination point is borne out by the views of the High 
Commissioner Henry Gurney,and Briggs himself, both of whom 
believed that 1950-1951 marked a watershed in the war 
against the Communists. For instance,on June 4th 1951 
Briggs and Gurney informed the Colonial Secretary that a 
'turning point' had been reached in the Emergency.However, 
they admitted that the Malayan Government,'lacked the 
impetus to carry its burden over the crest of the hill and 
begin the descent to victory. 1149 
It was because the Malayan Government 'lacked the 
impetus to carry its burden over the crest of the hill' 
that war dragged on for another nine years. Part of the 
reason for the weakness of the Malayan government lies in 
the slow implemenation of the Briggs Plan from 1950-
1951.Implementation was hindered by the fact that the 
military refused to take orders from their civilian 
counterparts.In addition,within the police force there was 
bitter rivalry between the Police Commissioner Nicol Gray 
and his local officers.Briggs advocated the following 
corrective measures:increased centralisation-in future the 
High Commissioner would control civil and military 
operations;all emergency matters to be dealt with at the 
3Federal level and increasing police numbers . 150 These 




policy aims were eventually realised when Churchill 
appointed General Sir Gerald Templer Governor of Malaya on 
January 13th 1952 . 151 
There is some evidence that Kecskemti's and Galtung's 
idea of a 'qualitative shift' also occurred during the 
Franco-Indochinese War.This shift occurred between February 
1952 and May 1953.After this date the outcome was 
irreversible for France.In February and September 1952 two 
important French strongholds in North Vietnam,Hoah Binh and 
Ngia Lo, fell to the Vietminh.In early 1953 the Vietminh 
began launching attack~ into Laos.By the middle of 1953 the 
French estimated that 5000 out of the 7000 villages in the 
Red River Delta were controlled by the Vietminh. 152 The 
Vietminh attacks on French garrisons indicated a 
progressive loss of French control in North Vietnam.This 
was a quantitative shift of such proportions that it 
amounted to a qualitative shift in power from the French to 
the Vietminh.Try as she might,France could not reverse this 
outcome. 
Galtung's theory also seems applicable to the French 
campaign in Algeria.The major qualitative shift on the 
battlefield occurred during 1959 with the French 
implementation of the Challe plan. From February to April 
1959 the French killed 1600 rebels,captured 460 weapons in 
the ouarsensis-Frenda mountain region,and destroyed the FLN 
administrative structure in the area.On March 28th 1959 the 




French killed the commanders of the 3rd and 4th Wilayas . 153 
On 22nd July 1959 they launched Operation Binoculars in 
Grand Kabylia,with side operations conducted in the 
adjacent Hodna mountains.When the operation ended in 
October,the French claimed 3746 rebels had been killed. 154 
Ferhat Abbas claimed that after Operation 
Binoculars,in which the FLN lost about 15,000 of their best 
fighters,there was no way that the FLN could achieve 
independence by military methods. 155 The FLN decision in 
January 1960 to maintain an army in being and reduce 
operations along the Morice Line,was a direct result of the 
mauling that they received from the French in 1959. 
Galtung's theory of qualitative shifts on the 
battlefield can also be applied to the Portuguese war in 
Mozambique.From May 1972 until December 1973 there seems to 
have been a qualitative shift in Frelimo's favour,with the 
war spreading from three northern provinces to the 
provinces of Manica and Sof ala in Central Mozambique. 156 
Central Mozambique was militarily and economically 
important to the Portuguese.Frelimo opened a new 
battlefront in Manica and Sofala,two provinces in Central 
Mozambique on July 25th 1972. 157 As a result Frelimo gained 
1
~ O'Ballance,p.133;P.Laffont,Histoire de la France en 
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access to the heavily populated centres of Beira,and also 
the Gorongosa Game Park,which was a popular tourist 
area . 158 According to Michael Degnan,Frelimo had five 
hundred guerrillas operating in Central Mozambique,with 50 
in the Vila Perry area and another 30 in the Gorongosa Game 
Park.The guerrillas made their presence felt by launching 
numerous attacks . 159 
on June 3 0th 19 7 3 , a Spanish surgeon was shot and 
killed as he landed his light aircraft at Maringue which 
was situated in Sofala province . 160 More attacks 
followed.In July 1973 a private plane was shot down near 
the port of Beira,which indicated that,'the guerrillas have 
penetrated to an area much further south. 1161 In mid-July 
1973, Frelimo guerrillas attacked a tourist camp in the 
Gorongoza Game park,an area close to the main road linking 
Beira with the Rhodesian capital of Salif:~bury . 162 On 31st 
December 1973,Frelimo derailed a passenger and goods train 
at the hamlet of Garuso. 
Frelimo incursions into Central Mozambique alarmed the 
Rhodesian Government and probably influenced the Rhodesian 
decision to increase the length of conscription from nine 
158 The Economist, 14th-21st July, 1973, p. 34. 
159 M.Degnan, 'The "Three Wars" of Mozambique' ,Africa Report, 
September-October 1973,p.13. 
160 The Economist,14th-21st July,1973,p.34 
161 The Times,llth July 1973. 
162 The Times, 21st July, 1973. 
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months to one year. 163 In a pre-recorded press conference 
televised on 4th December 1972,Ian Smith said, 
'The position in Mozambique has deteriorated because of 
increased efforts[by Frelimo] to disrupt the Cabera Bassa 
Project,but the Portuguese ,"believe they will put it 
right in time and I go along with this. 111164 
The opening up of the new battlefront,the extension of 
guerrilla operations from north to central Mozambique,and 
Rhodesian reactions to the new battlefront all support the 
idea of a dramatic and irreversible qualitative shift on 
the battlefield.It was no coincidence that these attacks 
were a precursor to the major deterioration of Portuguese 
control of Mozambique which began in January 1974. 
successive battlefield defeats and high casualties indicate 
the ending of a war.(Klingberg and Voevodsky) 
Both Klingberg and Voevodsky argued that successive 
battlefield defeats and high casualties indicate the ending 
of a war. 
Their idea seems to be supported by events in the 
Malayan Emergency.There were widespread surrenders of MCP 
guerrillas from 1957-60,indicating large scale 
demoralisation in the MCP rank and file membership. In 
Chapter Four(p.59) we mentioned the example of Hor Lung who 
163 The Economist,December 23rd-30th,1972,p.28. 
164 The Times, 5th December 1972. The Cabera Bassa Project 
was the construction of a dam in the Northern 
Mozambican province of Tete,which would provide Hydro 
Electric Power to Mozambique,Rhodesia and South Africa. 
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surrendered in April 1958. 
Klingberg's and Voevodsky's thesis also seems to be 
supported by events in the First Indochinese war as well. 
Here, a succession of military defeats over a period of 
fourteen months forced French leaders to concede that the 
war was unwinnable. The French garrison at Hoa Binh was 
attacked and overrun in February 1952.In December 1952 the 
Vietminh entered Laos.The garrison of Na San was overrun in 
1953.These defeats were perhaps even more decisive than the 
French loss of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, because they had a 
huge impact on French policy. After these losses, French 
leaders concluded that the war was lost.With victory out of 
the question,securing an honourable exit became 
paramount.Thus,in June 1953 the French Commander in Indo-
china, General Navarre,was ordered by Prime Minister Laniel 
to stabilise the worsening military situation in Laos and 
northern Vietnam. 
This of course means that the battle of Dien Bien Phu 
did not mark a termination point in the war.The rationale 
for the Dien Bien Phu airhead was to entice the Vietminh 
into battle,in the hope that a Vietminh defeat there would 
strengthen the French negotiating position. 165 This implies 
that France wished to terminate the war before the battle 
commenced. 166 Win or lose at Dien Bien Phu, France aimed to 
pull out from Indo-China. 
165 Davidson, p .131, 155,279; Roy, La Ba tail le •.. , p. 196; and 
Fall,Street Without Joy,pp.33-37,74. 
166 de la Gorce,p.79. 
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The ideas of Klingberg and Voevodsky also seem 
relevant to the war in Algeria. The two year period from 
1957-59 marked a series of military setbacks for the 
FLN.First,the FLN lost the Battle of Algiers.Second,the 
French launched the Challe plan in 1959 resulting in heavy 
casualties for the FLN.The details of these battles can be 
found in Chapter Three(pp.49-51).Taken together the Battle 
of Algiers and the Challe Plan fit the criteria postulated 
by Klingberg and Voevodsky. The FLN suffered a series of 
battle defeats over a two year period.The military result 
of the defeats was a scaling down of FLN military 
operations. 
Klingberg and Voevodsky's emphasis on the importance 
of battlefield defeats and high casualties as an indication 
of a termination point also seems relevant to the colonial 
war in Mozambique.Termination points can be identified as 
far back as July 1972,and in the campaign periods of 1972-3 
and 1973-4 we find that Portugal's position in Mozambique 
slowly deteriorated. 
The available evidence shows that Frelimo increased 
the scale and intensity of violence in the last two years 
of the war.When we discussed Galtung's idea of a 
'qualitative shift' ,we saw that Frelimo opened a new 
battlefront in Central Mozambique in July 1972 and also 
launched many attacks in this area during 1973. 
In the first six months of 1974 Frelimo increased its 
attacks across the country.The provinces of Tete,Manica and 
Sofala all saw an increase in military violence.For 
80 
example,on 6th January 1974 Frelimo launched an attack on 
Nhacambo village in Tete.A Portuguese farm was attacked in 
Vila Pery on 14th January . 167 On 2nd February, a freight 
train was derailed eighty miles north of Beira . 168 By May 
1974,Frelimo attacks were edging closer to the 
capital,Lourenco Marques.For instance,on 9th May Frelimo 
attacked a bus on the Lourenco Marques-Beira road and 
killed six people. 169 Earlier in the month it shot down a 
plane with a Russian made SAM 7 missile . 170 In June a 
resettlement village 120 miles north of Beira was burned 
down by Frelimo forces . 171 Frelimo captured the town of 
Morrumbala near the Malawi border on 12th July after a 
battle lasting for three days.This was the first conquest 
of its kind by Frelimo troops. 172 
It is clear that the years 1972-1974 marked a 
termination point in the war in Mozambique.Klingberg 1 s and 
Voevodsky's conception of a termination point in which 
military setbacks and high casualties indicate the ending 
of a war holds up well in this particular case study. 
167 The Economist,2nd-9th February,1974. 
168 The Times,4th February 1974. 
169 The Times,13th May 1974. 
170 The Economist,25th May-lst June,1974,p.40. 
171 The Times,8th June 1974. 




easer's idea of 'symbolic signposts' is not supported 
by any of the case studies considered in this dissertation. 
It is rare for major cities and towns to be captured in 
this kind of colonial warfare.This might be be due to the 
very low levels of violence used by the belligerents. 
However,Galtung's and Kecskemeti's idea of irreversible 
qualitative shifts holds up well in our case studies. In 
Malaya they occurred in the period 1951-54.After this date 
the outcome of the war was irreversible for the MCP. In 
Inda-China irreversible qualitative shifts occurred in the 
years 1952-1953.This is seen by the slow,progressive 
diminution of French control in North Vietnam.France lost 
control of 5000 villages in this period,as well as several 
important strongholds in north Vietnam.This situation was 
impossible to reverse. 
In Algeria the outcome became irreversible after the 
failure of the Challe Plan to knockout the FLN from their 
strongholds in Central Algeria.Both sides recognised that 
the situation was a military stalemate.Peace negotiations 
followed shortly afterward. In Mozambique irreverible 
qualitative shifts occurred in the period from June 1972 up 
to December 1973.New Frelimo battlefronts and an increase 
in the frequency and scale of Frelimo attacks indicate this 
shift on the battlefront.These attacks led to the collapse 
of Portuguese control in 1974. 
The ideas of Klingberg and Voevodsky ,both of whom 
suggested that successive battle defeats lead to war 
r 
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termination hold up quite well and we can assign 
approximate dates to their hypotheses.In Malaya their ideas 
are particularly relevant to the period of the Briggs Plan 
and Templer's governorship from 1951 up to 1954 when the 
British recognised that they had gained the upper 
hand.Their ideas also seem applicable to Indo-China,where 
after June 1953 France actively considered withdrawal from 
the colony.In Algeria,Klingberg and Voevodsky's ideas seem 
to fit the period from 1957-1959 which saw the Battle of 
Algiers and the Challe plan.Military stalemate was the 
result.The FLN scaled down its military operations and 
opened peace talks with the French.In Mozambique the 
termination points occurred in the period 1972-1974.This 
was a time when several new battlefronts were opened up. 
Perhaps these findings allow us to expand on the ideas 
of Klingberg and Voevodsky concerning battle defeats and 
war termination by suggesting three new hypotheses. 
First,when stalemate is the likely outcome after years of 
fighting, military and political leaders may decide to 
terminate the war.Second,when violence spreads or when new 
battlefronts are opened up,then the side facing the brunt 
of the new wave of violence may decide to cut its losses 
and terminate the war.Third,if a belligerent perceives that 
it will suffer massive casualties as a result of increased 
attacks,it might decide to terminate the war before more 






This chapter examines the views of Edward Azar who 
believed that de-escalation occurred when public opinion 
concluded that the costs of war have become too high to 
bear.It seems sensible to assume that the impetus to de-
escalate lies with the belligerent on the losing side of a 
war. 
Azar's Theory of De-Escalation 
Azar's ideas about de-escalation are not borne out by 
the British experience in Malaya.Although there is ample 
evidence pointing to a de-escalation of hostilities from 
1957-60,this process occurred because Britain had gained 
the upper hand in the war, not because of pressure from 
public opinion.The de-escalation process began during 
1957,three years before war's end.It occurred early because 
of the military successes of British COIN. We mentioned 
earlier the widespread surrenders of MCP guerrillas from 
1957-59,most notably that of Hor Lung in 1958. 
We now have to consider why the process of de-
escalation took such a long time.During the closing years 
of the Emergency the British launched, 'federal priority 
operations' which involved cordoning off villages,the 
maintainence of a high troop presence and the aim of 
denying food and sanctuary to the MCP.If these operations 




riots,which is what occurred at the new village at 
Semenyih.So the Malaysian government had to be less 
strict,but time for operations to take effect increased as 
a result. 173 For example, the Malaysian government conducted 
a twenty month operation in Johore codenamed Operation 
Cobble . 174 The British also tried to win over aborigines to 
their cause by providing them with basic health care and 
protection from attack.This strategy demanded patience and 
care.The process of setting up jungle forts,protecting the 
forts,providing medicare,and persuading tribal elders often 
took months. 175 
The Police also had to deal with large increases in 
the number of secret societies,and thus found less time to 
deal with the insurgency.As the regulations were 
relaxed,food supplies trickled through to the 
MCP. Finally, in poorer parts of Malaysia such as North 
Perak,the MCP still had a relatively strong base of 
support,and consequently a raison d'etre. 176 These five 
reasons help explain why it took so long to de-escalate the 
war. De-escalation in the Emergency also displayed some 
unusual features not considered by Azar.There was no 
general ceasefire,nor was there a peace treaty signed by 
the belligerents .Neither was there any normalisation of 
173 Stubbs, pp. 238-39. 
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relations between Britain and the MCP. 
Did the events of the Franco-Inda-Chinese war support 
any elements of Azar's theory? In France there were signs 
of a growing disenchantment with the war as it 
progressed.This process started in mid-1952,when two 
Socialist politicians,Alain Savary and Gaston 
Deferre,refused to vote for additional military expenditure 
for the Indochinese war.They argued that the war was a 
waste of lives and precious economic resources, and was 
unwinnable . 177 On the 15th-16th December 1952 the Socialist 
party urged the French government to negotiate with Ho Chi 
Minh . 178 
Nevertheless,despite growing public dissatisfaction 
with the war France did not de-escalate the violence until 
an armistice was signed in July 1954 .Moreover, it would 
stretch the English language to say that both sides' 
normalised their relations.Distrust and hostility are the 
words which sum up Franco-Vietminh relations from 1945 
onwards;distrust and hostility characterised the 
relationship between South and North Vietnam after 1954 .The 
actors may have changed,but the script remained more or 
less the same for another twenty one years. 
And the Franco-Algerian war does not lend much 
credence to Azars 's ideas about public opinion and de-
escalation either.There were signs of a growing 
1
" de la Gorce,pp.62-65,69-71;and R.Irving,The First 
Indochinese War,(London:Croom Helm,1975),p.62,115. 
1 n de la Gorce,p.71. 
86 
disenchantment with the war in the period 1960-62.Examples 
of war weariness include a one hour strike on February 1st 
1960 by student and trade unions in protest against the 
Algerian War . 179 French cinemas released films with an 
anti-war bias such as Les Liasons Dangereuses. 180 In 
September 1960 the left wing manifesto of the 121 argued 
that conscripts had the right to refuse to fight in the 
Algerian war . 181 Laffont believes that the manifesto had 
symbolic rather than practical importance-only 500 men are 
believed to have deserted out of a total army of half a 
million men in Algeria. 182 
Although there was growing French dissatisfaction with 
the war from 1959-62,there was neither a reduction in 
hostilities nor a normalisation of relations between the 
two belligerents. Continuing violence occurred because of 
terrorism conducted by the Secret Army organisation (OAS) 
and by the FLN in the towns of Algiers and Oran.From 
February to June 1962,French leaders in Paris were 
confronted with the task of curtailing violence between 
several factions of the community.on the one hand there was 
violence between French settlers and the FLN, and on the 
other,between the FLN and Algerians who had sided with the 
French during the war.France could not de-escalate the war 
because she needed a large troop presence to maintain civil 
v 9 O'Ballance,p.157. 
180 Horne,p.415-416. 
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order. 
There are scores of examples of terrorism in the 
period from June 1961 to wars end in March 1962.For 
instance, the OAS killed over 500 people in Algiers in 
February 1962.0n 1st March 1962 the OAS planted a bomb in 
Oran and the explosion killed 23 Muslims .1.83 After the 
Evian peace agreement was signed OAS terrorism increased.On 
23rd March the OAS murdered 7 French conscripts and wounded 
11 others .1.84 On 26th March the OAS held a series of 
demonstrations in Algiers.Tirailleur units of Harkis 
panicked and fired into the crowd,killing 46 and injuring 
200 .1.as When a truce was signed by the OAS and FLN on 17th 
June 1962, 2,360 had been killed in a year of civil 
violence. 1.a6 
The second wave of violence was conducted by the FLN 
against people it regarded as traitors,and there was also 
violence in the settlement of old tribal scores. French 
troops administering the ceasefire had to stand by while 
thousands of collaborators were executed by their fellow 
countrymen.Between 30-150,000 harkis,or soldiers who had 
fought on the French side,were murdered.Entire families 
were killed, often being tortured before being burned to 
death .1.s7 Factional terrorism prevented a de-escalation of 
1.s3 Horne,pp.513-16. 
1.s4 Talbott,p.232 and O'Ballance,p.197. 
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the violence in Algeria. France had to maintain its high 
troop presence in order to maintain civil order. 
In the Portuguese war in Mozambique de-escalation 
occurred after the coup of April 1974. 188 It was a 
haphazard affair with soldiers and Portuguese citizens 
taking the initiative rather than obeying a general order 
from the Portuguese High Command. 
There were many cases of soldiers abandoning the 
fighting and confining themselves to barracks.In July 1974 
soldiers deserted their units or surrendered en masse to 
Frelimo.Also in that month, 2000 men at Boane declared 
allegiance to Frelimo,as did marines in Zambezia. 189 
Fraternisation between Frelimo and Portuguese became more 
commonplace during July and August.on the 17th July Frelimo 
and Portuguese soldiers held a goodwill meeting at an army 
barracks twelve miles from the Rhodesian border-although 
ironically Frelimo attacked the garrison a day later •190 
Black troops-who comprised 60% of Portuguese troops in 
Mozambique-began to lay down their weapons in Northern 
Mozambique.At the end of July, 23 white cattle ranchers in 
Namacurra allegedly sent a cable to the Frelimo leader 
Machel asking for 'protection in the future. ' 191 At the end 
of August four newly built Portuguese garrisons in northern 
188 see Chapter Eight,regarding the April 1974 Coup in 
Portugal. 
189 Munslow ,Mozambique ,pp.126-128. 
190 The Times, 20th July 1974. 
191 The Times, 30th July 1974. 
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Mozambique were handed over to Frelimo.The move was 
part, 'of a continuing reduction of hostilities between 
military forces and Frelimo. 1192 
The increased fraternisation between Portuguese 
soldiers and Frelimo illustrates the demoralisation in the 
Portuguese army and an acceptance by a large number of 
soldiers that Portugal had lost the war. One could argue 
that the public opninion which mattered and which had the 
biggest effect on de-escalation belonged to the military 
and settlers.Once they had accepted that the war was lost 
they de-escalated the violence and normalised relations 
with Frelimo.Looked at in this light Azar's ideas on public 
opinion and de-escalation are supported by events in 
Mozambique,but there are few signs that public opinion in 
Portugal played a significant role. 
summary 
Azar argued that when the pain becomes too great 
public opinion will force belligerents to wind down 
hostilities and normalise relations.In Malaya de-escalation 
followed British military success on the battlefield.There 
is no evidence that public opinion forced Britain to de-
escalate.Moreover,Britain was not able to normalise 
relations with the MCP because Chin Peng fled to 
Thailand.In Indo-China there were symptoms of war weariness 
but it was not strong enough to de-escalate the war.In fact 
de-escalation only began after an agreement was signed at 
192 The Times, 30th August 1974. 
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Geneva between the various belligerents. Nor was there a 
normalisation of relations,a state of affairs undoubtedly 
related to the Cold War. 
In Algeria we found some evidence of war weariness but 
again this was insufficient to effect a de-escalation of 
the violence.Civil unrest in Algerian towns and cities 
continued.Yet when the war ended France normalised 
relations with the newly independent state.Finally,in 
Mozambique de-escalation occurred in a fairly haphazard 
manner with Portuguese troops surrendering in droves in the 
last three months of the war.At wars end Portugal 
normalised relations with the new state. 
Clearly,Azar's ideas on de-escalation have to be 
modified to take into account civil unrest,battlefield 
successes and international political factors such as the 
Cold War.Relations between belligerents will be normalised 
if an armistice or peace treaty is signed,or when the war 
is not part of a wider ideological conflict.Failure to 
normalise relations can lead to future conflicts. 
Chapter Seven 
Public Opinion and Prolongation of War 
Introduction 
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This chapter will examine the views of Lewis 
Richardson and Raymond o' Connor who argued that public 
opinion can delay war termination.Leaders who fly in the 
face of public opinion and try and terminate a war will 
fail.Also will also discussed is Fred Ikle's view that war 
termination can be delayed by a struggle between 'hawks' 
and 'doves.' Unfortunately,the closure of state archives 
makes it almost impossible to see whether there was a 
struggle between hawks and doves in the Inda-China and 
Mozambique cases .Attention is therefore focused on the 
Algerian war where this battle spilled into open violence 
between various sections of the French community. 
'War Termination is delayed because public opinion will not 
permit the ending of war.' 
The behaviour of the French . National Assembly from 
1946 to 1952 supports the view of Richardson and O'Connor 
that public opinion can delay war termination.In this six 
year period all attempts to end the Franco-Indochinese war 
failed.There were several reasons for this state of 
affairs.First,Indochina was regarded as an integral part of 
France.Second,there was the widespread fear,common during 
the Cold War, that if one colony fell to the Communists 
others would soon foilow. 
Charles DeGaulle summed up the French colonial 
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mentality best when he declared on 27th August 1946: 
'United with the overseas territories which she opened 
to civilisation,France is a great power.Without these 
territories she would be in danger of no longer being 
one .193 
For DeGaulle the possession of an empire conferred 
greatness on the colonial power.In one of History's ironies 
even the French Communist party supported French colonial 
policy in the first year of the war . 194 
The second reason why French politicians were 
determined to fight on in Indochina was the fear of what a 
communist victory would entail.This fear increased after 
the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950.From that point 
on,the war in Indochina was seen as a necessary evil in the 
fight against Communism. 195 Somewhat ironically, one of the 
consequences of this anti-communist climate and the desire 
to protect the Union was the French reluctance to grant 
meaningful independence to the Associated states of 
Indochina,a decision which resulted in a loss of prestige 
for the Bao Dai government. 196 
The net result of these two French attitudes-fear of 
Communism and the wish to retain an empire-was pressure to 
continue the war.Those who tried to end the war were left 
politically isolated.For example,when,during October 1950, 
193 Hammer , p . 19 o • 
19
' ibid,p.190 ;and Buttinger ,p. 279. 
195 Irving, p .153. 
196 ibid, pp. 60-62. 
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Pierre Mendes-France said that France had to reach a 
settlement with Ho,his plea fell on deaf ears.The 
Socialists refused to negotiate with the Vietminh and the 
Republican Party led by Bidault distrusted Mendes-
France. 197 Two years were to elapse before France 
contemplated negotiations with the Vietminh. Richardson's 
and O'Connor's idea that public opinion can delay the 
ending of a war seems to be supported by evidence in the 
case of the French experience in Inda-China. 
Richardson's view that public opinion can delay the 
ending of war is also supported by evidence from the 
Franco-Algerian War. In this case military and civilian 
elements in France resisted attempts to terminate the 
war. French settlers were very influential in the French 
National Assembly from 1954-59,and from January 2nd 1956 
their views were represented by 52 Poujadists,led by their 
namesake, Pierre Pou jade. The party was pro-pied noir, and 
believed that France must protect her empire. 198 The voices 
of French settlers were listened to because of the close 
proximity of Algeria to France and because the colony 
contained one million French settlers . 199 French 
governments in the period from 1954-58 were dependent on 
settler support,the price of which was a hardline Algerian 
policy.Alfred Grosser sums up the French colonial dilemma 
197 de la Goree, pp. 62-65. 
198 Horne,p.126;de la Gorce,pp.305-306;and Laffont,p.433. 





'to give liberty to those in the colonies,governments 
needed the support of the Communists;to protect liberties 
at home from Communism,governments needed the support 
of those who refused to give it to the colonies. 1200 
When the Mendes-France government won a vote of confidence 
on 12th November 1954,Mendes-France was helped by a group 
of European settlers,led by Rene Mayer,who urged that 
France should take a tough stance against the FLN. 201 
The second faction which opposed withdrawal was an 
element within the French Army.Part of the explanation for 
the army's behaviour lies in its politicisation during the 
Indo-Chinese and Algerian wars.War veterans were united by 
common wartime experiences in Indo-China and Suez,and by a 
belief that integration,rather than independence was the 
preferable solution to the war.Veterans also resented 
French politicians who blamed the army for the loss of the 
war in Indochina.They were also bonded by a strong streak 
of anti-Communism and by the belief that it was justifiable 
to intervene in French domestic polities to further the 
cause of French Algeria. 202 This last point is exemplified 
by the hi jacking of Ben Bella and other FLN leaders in 
October 1956 and the Sakhiet bombing of February 1958,in 
which military planners rather than politicians initiated 
200 Grosser, p. 398. 
201 Horne, p. 9 9 . 
202 de la Gorce,pp. 435-440 ;and Behr ,pp.132-137. 
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policy. 203 
In this paranoid climate those who tried to terminate 
the Algerian war failed.We have two good examples of this 
in the Algerian War, the first in October 1956 and the 
second in April 1958.During October 1956 France and the FLN 
held several rounds of talks in Belgrade.At one of their 
meetings on the 22nd October 1956,the FLN laid down its 
demands which included a general ceasefire,recognition of 
the right to independence and French recognition of the FLN 
as the sole representative of the Algerian People. 204 The 
talks came to nothing. 
Talbott correctly pointed out that it was politically 
impossible for the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet to 
accept the FLN's demands without being toppled from power 
in Paris by a rightwing backlash led by the ex-Governor 
General of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle. 205 So strong was the 
feeling to retain Algeria that opponents of the war were 
arrested for 'demoralising' the army. 206 A similar 
proposal for a ceasefire in April 1958 met the same fate.on 
the 23rd April 1958 the French Prime Minister Pflimlin 
offered the FLN a ceasefire,but his offer was bitterly 
opposed by senior French commanders who argued that the 
'weight of the dead' made it ludicrous to abandon 
Algeria. It would mean that French soldiers had died for 
203 de la Goree, pp. 443-445. 
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nothing.The army's concerns about the abandonment of 
Algeria were very evident in the joint letter written by 
Generals Salan, Jouhaud, Allard and Massu to General Ely 
the army Chief of Staff in Paris,on the 9th May 1958.The 
four generals expressed deep concern at the abandonment of 
Algeria and the Muslims they had sworn to protect, and 
warned that the army was in a desperate state. 207 Unless 
France preserved French Algeria,then the Army would 'feel 
outraged by the abandonment of this national patrimony.One 
cannot predict how [the army]would react in its 
despair. 1208 Four days later the army participated in a 
coup which toppled the Fourth Republic. 
It is clear that two elements in France opposed war 
termination-right wing elements in the French National 
Assembly and the military.Both groups believed that since 
Algeria contained a million French settlers France had the 
duty to defend them.Some also thought that empires 
conferred greatness on the colonial power. For war 
termination to occur the military and right wing supporters 
of French Algeria would have to be overcome. 
As far as the Portuguse war in Mozambique is 
concerned,it is difficult to argue that war termination was 
delayed because of the pressure of public opinion.We have 
no evidence that Portugal opened peace talks before the 
April 1974 coup.Nor do we have any public opinion surveys 
pointing to Portuguese support for the war.Our analysis is 




based upon newspaper reports and journal articles from the 
period 1964-1974.Based upon these sources it appears that 
Portugal had at least three reasons for fighting the war in 
Mozambique.First was the ideological importance attached to 
fighting the Communist backed Frelimo movement. Second was 
the belief that empires granted prestige.Finally the colony 
was economically important to Portugal. These reasons may 
have strongly influenced public support for the war. 
The Portuguese regime under Salazar and his successor 
Caetano was anti-communist and the Portuguese government 
did not want Mozambique and Angola to fall into the hands 
of the Marxist Frelimo movement.The correspondent for Le 
Monde argued that the Portuguese really believed that they 
were defending the Atlantic from Communist forces who were 
regarded as the epitome of evil in Lisbon. 209 The 
maintainence of an empire was also regarded as 
prestigious.On 2nd December 1969 Noguerira the Portuguese 
Foreign minister told the Lisbon National Assembly: 
'It would be absurd to say the least,if we Portuguese,who 
have at our disposition an extensive economic space 
favoured by solid political unity,were to destroy the 
one and break the other,abandoning a construction where 
we have everything in order to integrate in something 
else which is dominated by others and where we should be 
nothing . 1210 
He meant that Portugal would be small and weak without her 
209 Le Mon de , 1 Oth December 19 6 5 . 
no African Diary,1-7th January,1970,p.4776. 
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colonial possessions and if she joined a bloc such as the 
European community, Portugal would be dominated by other 
countries. 
Finally,it is worth remembering that the colony was 
economically valuable to Portugal. In 1968 the Financial 
Times wrote that,'with Angola and Mozambique showing signs 
of being big money winners for Portugal, any talk of the 
country pulling out of Africa seems unreal at this 
stage.' 211 We have many examples suggesting that Mozambique 
was a ,'big winner.' 
Mozambique was the site of the Cabora Bassa Dam 
project,which aimed to provide hydro electric power to 
Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa. 212 In addition, the 
ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques were used as exporting 
outlets for Zambia and Malawi. During 1965 21% of 
Mozambique's international payment receipts were derived 
from transit earnings. 213 In 1968 Zambia exported 15-20,000 
tonnes of copper per month which went via Rhodesian 
railways to Beira and Lourenco Marques. 214 Mozambique 
contained natural gas deposits near the town of Beira and 
rich mineral deposits in the north eastern provinces. 215 
Based upon this analysis it seems sensible to assume that 
211 The Financial Times,13th November 1968. 
212 The Guardian, 3rd December 1966. 
213 Jennnifer Davis,' Allies in Empire,' Africa Today, 
vol.17(4),Jul-Aug 1970,p.14. 
214 The Financial Times, 26th November 1968. 
215 The Guardian, 30th December 1966. 
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Mozambique was just too valuable a colony to let go. 
War Termination is delayed because of the struggle between 
'hawks' and 'doves.' 
Fred Ikle compared the war termination process to a 
struggle between hawks and doves.Only when this battle is 
resolved can a war end.His views are illustrated by an 
examination of the efforts to end the Franco-Algerian 
war. Here army and settler 'hawks' were pitted against 
civilian 'doves. 'The contest was a violent and bloody 
affair involving Frenchmen killing Frenchmen,a settler 
rebellion in 1960 ,a coup attempt by French generals in 
1961,and the total collapse of civilian authority in 
Algeria from 1961 up to the war's end in March 1962. 
Charles De Gaulle faced a major challenge to his 
political authority in January 1960.0n the 18th January the 
French leader met FLN leaders and agreed to hold future 
negotiations on Algeria. 216 Although these talks were about 
procedures for peace negotiations,whites in Algeria became 
alarmed. Fearful of their long term future,a small group of 
settlers took to the streets in Algiers and errected 
barricades on January 24th. 217 Unlike Guy Mollet who, in a 
similar incident in 1956 capitulated to the Algerian mob,De 
Gaulle was made of sterner stuff. He refused to make any 
concessions to the French settlers and after a tense week 
216 Kelly, pp. 263-264. 
217 Behr ,pp.163-164 ;Laffont ,P. 478 ;Talbott ,p.158 ;and 
Kelly,p.270. 
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the rebellion petered out. 218 The defeat of the settlers 
saw the removal of a major obstacle to peace.From now on 
only the French military was in a position to thwart the 
peace process. 
Fourteen months after Barricades Week a small group of 
French officers took the drastic step of staging a coup 
which aimed to topple De Gaulle.The coup leaders-Generals 
Jouhaud,Zeller,Challe and Salan-were veterans of wars in 
Indochina and Algeria, and all felt that De Gaulle was 
betraying French intersts by holding peace talks with the 
FLN.They also thought De Gaulle was putting Algerian 
collaborators into grave danger. 219 
On 22nd April 1961 these four generals staged a coup 
in Algiers which spread to Oran.Fortunately for De Gaulle 
and the peace process the coup was a fiasco. Few junior 
officers were prepared to sacrifice their military careers 
for the sake of the French colony,and because of its very 
narrow base of support the coup was quashed three days 
later. 220 Unfortunately, this coup was not the 'hawks' last 
word on the Algerian problem. 
Like a poisoned rat which runs about maniacally 
shortly before dying,a group of French settlers and 
disgruntled French soldiers set up the Secret Army 
218 Behr,pp.170,247-251.Talbott,pp.159-160;0'Ballance,p.150; 
and Kelly,pp.275-77. 
219 Horne, pp. 441-444; Talbott, pp, 183, 204-205; and Kelly, p. 316. 
220 Horne, pp. 445-459 ;O'Ballance ,pp.170-185 ;Kelly, pp. 311-
324 ;Talbott, pp. 204-210 ;Laffont, pp. 496-497 ;and 
Behr,p.183. 
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Organisation(OAS) and tried to dish the peace process with 
a terrorism campaign.Although the OAS ultimately failed to 
derail the peace process, Algeria was plunged into complete 
anarchy from May 1961 up to March 1962. Whites killed 
whites and whites killed blacks in a bloody killing spree 
which spread from Algiers to Oran and on to Paris.After a 
year of mayhem and destruction over 2,300 lay dead. 
Summary 
Richardson suggested that public opinion can delay war 
termination.A brief summary of our findings is as follows. 
In Indochina,French politicians believed that empires 
conferred great power status and prestige.After 1950 the 
war became a Cold War theatre and fear of Communism became 
yet another reason for continuing the war. Politicans who 
urged a withdrawal were lone voices lost in the din of 
anti-Communism and imperialism.In Algeria,French politicans 
were driven by the desire to protect the livelihoods of one 
million French settlers.The settlers blocked two attempts 
to end the war in 1956 and 1958.The system of proportional 
representation gave the settlers a political voice 
disproportionate to their numbers. In Mozambique the 
Portuguese leaders were motivated by three considerations. 
They believed that possessing an empire conferred 
greatness.They were also staunchly anti-Communist. 
Finally,they thought the colonies were too valuable 
economically to let go. 
Fred Ikle argued that war termination involves a 
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struggle between hawks and doves.We tested his idea on the 
Algerian war and in general our findings vindicate his 
view.There was a lengthy and bloody battle between settler 
and military hawks and civilian doves which lasted from 
1954-1962. Settlers blocked peace efforts in 1956 and 
1958,staged a rebellion in January 1960 and the army led an 




'Re-orientation' means a shift in direction or change 
of course.When referring to the war termination process re-
orientation refers to the shift from prosecuting a war to 
actively seeking ways to end it.The re-orientation process 
has two main characteristics.First,Robert Randle and Lewis 
Richardson have argued that war termination is possible 
after a change in public opinion.Second, Morton Hal~erin 
and Robert Rothstein believe that when a war becomes 
unwinnable there will be a change of regime or the 
replacement of military commanders. This chapter will be 
divided into two sections and will examine each of the 
theories in turn to see whether historical reality supports 
them. 
War Termination occurs when public opinion turns against 
the war. 
The ideas of Richardson and Randle on public opinion 
and war termination seem to be supported by events in the 
Franco-Indochinese war.Here the political reorientaion 
began in mid 1952,when several politicians such as Alain 
Savary and Gaston Deferre refused to vote for additional 
military expenditure for the Indochinese war.They argued 
that the war was a waste of lives and precious economic 
resources and was militarily unwinnable. 221 On the 15th-
16th December 1952, the Socialist Party urged the French 
2 n de la gorce,pp.62-65,69-71;and Irving,p.62,115. 
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government to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh. 222 
We now have to consider why the war dragged on for 
another nineteen months.First,the French government wanted 
to negotiate from a position of strength.Therefore it had 
to stabilise the military situation.Second,a sudden 
withdrawal would leave the Bao Dai government vulnerable to 
attack.This point explains why Laniel obtained $385m from 
the United States in September 1953 . 223 Third,rightwing 
politicians were still a powerful group in the National 
Assembly. For instance, the Foreign Minister, Bidaul t remained 
unconvinced that the war was unwinnable.He managed to 
persuade Laniel in December 1.953 not to open bilateral 
talks with the Vietminh,and argued that the best course of 
action was multilateral talks with the Vietminh. 22' So, for 
all these reasons the effect of public opinion on the war 
was delayed,but the basic truth of Randle's and 
Richardson's hypothesis is unaffected by the delay of a few 
months. 
The ideas of Richardson and Randle on public opinion 
and war termination also seem to be supported by an 
examination of the Algerian war.In this case we are 
fortunate to have some opinion poll findings of the French 
Institute of Public Opnion(IFOP) from the period 1.955 up to 
222 de la Goree, p. 71.. 
n 3 Irving,pp.117-11.8;and de la Gorce,p.81.. 
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1963. 225 When De Gaulle first raised the issue of Algerian 
self determination in a speech on 18th September 1959,the 
IFOP polled Frenchmen a few days later.Fifty four percent 
of those polled supported De Gaulle's policy.Only seventeen 
percent disagreed. 226 
The IFOP predicted that seventy percent of the 
electorate would vote 'Yes' in the January 1961 referendum 
on self determination.As it happened seventy five percent 
of the electorate voted 'Yes.' 227 By May 1961 sixty percent 
of the respondents polled by the IFOP thought independence 
was inevitable. 228 In early 1962 the IFOP asked people if 
they had any sympathy with the French settlers living in 
Algeria. over half felt no sympathy whatsoever. 229 Based on 
this evidence we can discern two important strands in 
public opinion.We find that there was growing public 
support for independence and,in addition,by 1962,the pied 
noirs had fallen out of favour with opinion in Metropolitan 
France.One could say that the high support for De Gaulle's 
policies towards Algeria reflected the public mood,which 
was one of war weariness.One must also remember that France 
had been engaged in continuous war since 1939-with 
Germany,then Indochina,then Algeria with scarcely time to 
225 
226 
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pause for breath. 
Richardson and Randle's idea about public opinion and 
war termination also seems to apply to the Mozambican war. 
While not having any opinion poll surveys to support our 
analysis,we do have evidence of military resentment against 
the war.There is also evidence that government leaders may 
have been swayed by the belief that the war was 
economically too costly. 
The war in Mozambique(and the other African colonies) 
caused much bitterness amongst soldiers.Despite intensive 
COIN the Portuguese were failing to defeat the 
insurgents.Some soldiers feared that blame for the failure 
to defeat Frelimo would be placed on their shoulders, and 
that officers would face humiliating show trials in 
Lisbon,which was the fate of those officers involved in the 
loss of Goa to India in 1961. 230 Pre-coup ideas of the MFA 
stressed the humiliation of the army: 
'The armed forces are humiliated ••.. and presented to the 
nation as those most responsible for the disaster. ' 231 
Soldiers disliked long tours of duty in the colonies. 
Civilian life was preferable to sweating out four to five 
years in dangerous African jungles.This is illustrated by 
the large number of draft evaders during the war's 
230 
231 
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duration.Over 110,000 men avoided military service from 
1961-1974,fleeing to France and West Germany. 232 Junior 
officers disliked the incompetence of their commanders, 
regarding them as 'too old,too ill and not modern enough to 
fight a counterinsurgency war. ' 233 There were other 
grievances too.Colonial soldiers lacked social facilities 
in the jungle.There was a cigarette and chocolate shortage, 
hospitals proved inadequate and resources were stretched. 
(South Africa's Southern Cross fund helped provide hospital 
facilities, while other South African groups donated 
cigarettes and the like. ) 234 
Martin Kayman has argued that Portugal was not 
economically strong enough to fight a protracted colonial 
war. Portugal's fundamental weakness was "the divorce of 
production from the internal market and the accumulation of 
finance rather than industrial capital. 11235 • He meant that 
the economy was based on financial speculation and low 
technology industries. In addition,Portugal was not self 
sufficient due to a weak agricultural system.Wages were 
low,Portugal having one of the lowest G.N.P. per capita 
rates in Europe throughout the war's duration.A low 
standard of living resulted in many Portuguese citizens 
emigrating to France and West Germany in the 1960s and 
232 Porch, p. 3 2 . 
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1970s.In such a fragile economic state,Portugal could not 
afford to spend 40% of government expenditure on colonial 
wars-it made no economic sense at all. 236 The logical 
outcome of such a view is that when too much money is spent 
for little or no gain,then withdrawal is necessary. 
Informed public opinion in Portugal increasingly reflected 
this view. 
War Termination involves a change of regime 
To some extent,the ideas of Rothstein and Halperin on 
regime change and war termination can be seen in the Indo-
Chinese war. In this case, the most significant political 
change in the French National Assembly was the election of 
Laniel as Prime minister in late June 1953. 237 On July 3rd 
1953 Laniel declared his desire to grant full independence 
to the Associated states. 238 There was a new government and 
a new policy for Inda-China.One could add,by way of an 
aside,that after July 1953,the French National Assembly was 
psychologically preparing itself for withdrawal. 
The ideas of Halperin and Rothstein concerning the 
necessity of changing a regime in order for peace to occur 
can also be seen in the Algerian war. This process was 
characterised by the banning of rightwing groups,the 
sacking of rebellious army officers and by a tightening of 
De Gaulle's grip on Algerian policy.It occurred from 1960 
236 ibid, pp .1-27. 
237 Irving, p .116. 
238 Grosser ,p. 288 ;Fauvet,p. 252 ;and de la Goree ,pp. 80-81. 
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to May 1961. 
The first changes followed Barricades Week,the causes 
of which were discussed in the previous chapter(p.95.) De 
Gaulle banned the French National Front.Second,the 
Territorial Army,a kind of European home guard,was 
disbanded. In a reorganisation of Algerian policy making 
bodies,a committee on Algerian Affairs was set up in the 
Elysee Palace.The President and Prime Minister were members 
of the committee,and from February 1960 until 1962 the 
committee would make most of the decisions concerning 
French Algerian policy.De Gaulle thus acquired a tight grip 
on Algerian policy. 2 = 
Furthermore,on February 2nd 1960 De Gaulle obtained 
new powers to legislate by decree.One result was the 
dissolution of the Cinquieme Bureau which was an army unit 
specialising in psychological warfare. 240 The French 
President's position was strengthened both domestically and 
internationally as a result of these changes.Moreover,the 
FLN could no longer accuse the French of mollifying pied 
noirs in Algiers. 241 More changes followed the abortive 
coup attempt by French generals in April 1961. 242 In May 
1961 rebellious officers were put on trial,whilst several 
Foreign Legion units were disbanded. 243 In short, there is 
239 ibid,p.162. 
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plenty of evidence that a change of regime was critical to 
French withdrawal. 
Halperin's and Rothstein's ideas on war termination 
involving a changing of regime are also supported by events 
in the Portuguese war in Mozambique.In this case,the 
Caetano regime was toppled by a group of disgruntled army 
officers.This dramatic change resulted in the opening of 
peace talks with Frelimo.The origins of the military coup 
can be traced back to the Rebelo decree of July 13th 
1973.Ironically these decrees were a sensible attempt to 
deal with a chronic officer shortage.After the failure of 
Operation Gordian Knot in 1970,the army switched to 
officer-intensive mobile tactical units.The new tactics 
demanded large numbers of captains and majors .However, 
Portugal suffered from a serious officer shortage. 244 The 
main reason for the officer shortage stemmed from the 
unpopularity of a career in the military. 245 
Thus,on July 13th 1973,the government passed the 
' 
Rebelo decrees which implemented accelerated courses at the 
military academy.Conscript officers only needed one or two 
years at the academy,whereas professional soldiers needed 
four.This meant that a graduate from university with only 
one year of service could overtake a soldier who had served 
four years.This attack on seniority was resented by 
244 Graham,L.S. 'The Military in Politics:The Politic-
isation of the Portuguese Armed Forces.'In Contemporary 
Portugal:The Revolution and its Antecedents.Edited by 





professional soldiers,even though the reasoning behind the 
scheme was based upon sound military sense. 246 In his 
memoirs Caetano admits that the reforms caused much 
disgruntlement amongst soldiers: 
'There are captains,he told me,who have jumped Lieutenant-
Colonels[in seniority.] And he reminded me of the enormous 
importance a soldier attaches to his seniority on the 
ladder: 'seniority is a job. ' 247 
After the Rebelo reform,meetings took place amongst army 
officers who plotted the downfall of the regime.They 
succeeded in doing so on April 1st 1974. 
Several writers have suggested that the coup leaders 
became indoctrinated by the African revolutionaries whom 
they were fighting,and after realising what a dictatorship 
the Caetano government was, decided to overthrow it. The 
evidence for this rests on MFA associations being set up in 
the colonies and soldiers defecting to the insurgents and 
being subsequently indoctrinated by them.In an interview 
with a Portuguese soldier called Joao Quelhas, a Portuguese 
Communist Party member claimed that the PCP managed to 
infiltate the army and circulate revolutionary propaganda 
sympathetic to the guerrillas' cause. 248 This is an 
attractive theory but needs more evidence to support it. 
246 Kayman,pp.58-61. 
247 M.Caetano,o Depoimento. (Rio de Janeiro.1978. )p.185. 
Quoted in Porch,p.65. 
248 Munslow ,Mozambigue ,p .126, 132. 
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Summary 
Randle and Richardson argued that war termination 
becomes possible after a shift in public opinion.Here is a 
summary of our findings. 
In Inda-China public opinion shifted against the war 
in late 1952.The rationale for the shift was that the war 
was regarded by some politicians as a waste of lives and· 
resources.In Algeria the French public began to grow weary 
of war in 1960. Successive opinion surveys from the IFOP 
indicate this shift.In Mozambique the military became war 
weary.Soldiers were fearful of being blamed for defeat and 
disliked long tours of duty in the African jungle. The 
Portuguese government may also have been swayed by the view 
that war was too expensive to continue. 
Halperin and Rothstein argued that war termination 
involves a change of regime. In Inda-China there was a 
change of government in July 1953,and with this change came 
a new policy.France was to disengage from the war.In 
Algeria DeGaulle sacked military commanders and banned 
right wing parties.He ruled by decree and limited Algerian 
policy making to just a handful of advisers.This political 
consolidation allowed him to end the Algerian war.Change 
was forced upon the luckless Caetano regime when a small 
band of army officers overthrew the Portuguese government 
in April 1974.With the new junta came new colonial 
polices.Five months later the war in Mozambique ended. 
113 
Chapter Nine 
This chapter will discuss the theories of Robert 
Randle,Paul Pillar and Nicholas Timasheff.Accordingly,the 
chapter will be divided into two sections.The first section 
will examine the ideas of Randle and Pillar on the subject 
of bargaining strategies in the peace making process.This 
is followed by an examination of Timasheff's view that if 
a peace settlement is unsatisfactory to one of the 
belligerents then the resulting resentment will undermine 
the treaty. 
Negotiating Peace 
Robert Randle and Paul Pillar both maintained that 
successful peace talks require common areas of interest on 
which agreement could be reached.Pillar has described in 
considerable detail the bargaining tactics used by 
diplomats to secure an agreement.Hardline approaches,the 
threat of escalation and the imposition of deadlines were 
some of the methods listed by Pillar as necessary for 
reaching an agreement. 2 ' 9 We will now test them against the 
reality of our case studies. 
The Malayan Emergency provides fertile ground to test 
these ideas on peace negotiations.The British and MCP met 
at Baling on December 28th 1955 and held talks there for 
two days.Chin Peng the leader of the MCP demanded the legal 
recognition of his party but his Malayan counterpart,Tunku 
Rahman,refused to accept this.Rahman argued that the real 
2
'
9 Pillar,pp.207-8 and 217-19. 
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issues at stake were whether or not the MCP would accept 
the British government's amnesty of MCP forces, and its 
demand that those who surrendered must not engage in 
activities prejudicial to the state of Malaya.The second 
demand was unacceptable to Chin Peng since he believed that 
it would marginalise the MCP in Malayan politics. 250 
Nethertheless the talks resulted in an agreed 
communique being issued: 
'As soon as the elected governments of the Federation 
obtain complete control of internal security and local 
armed forces,we will end hostilities,lay down our arms and 
disband our armies.It does not amount to accepting the 
present amnesty terms.'~i 
It should be noted here that when Malaya achieved 
independence in 1957 the MCP did not disband and still 
continued to fight.Arguably,Chin Peng was not prepared to 
honour his agreement with the British. 
Given the fundamental differences between MCP and 
the British it is unsurprising that the Baling peace talks 
failed to produce peace. We see clearly that if there are 
no common bargaining issues,peace talks will inevitably 
break down and fail to end hostilities.In a negative 
way,Pillar and Randle's theories on the essential 
commonality of interests as a pre-requisite to successful 
bargaining seem to be supported. 
250 Short,The communist Insurrection,pp.463-65;and 
Miller,pp.189-92. 
25i Short, The Communist Insurrection, p. 466. 
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Pillar described in detail the bargaining tactics used 
by peace negotiators.There is no evidence that any of these 
tactics were used at Baling.Each belligerent stated its 
case in what could be described as a frank exchange of 
views and neither side insisted on the compliance of the 
other.There are two possible reasons for the apparent 
absence of Pillar's bargaining tactics.First,the British 
were winning the war by 1955 and seemed to have had no 
domestic compulsion to end it quickly.Second,the MCP was in 
no military position to force the British to accept its 
peace terms. 
The ideas of Randle and Pillar on the subject of 
bargaining issues and diplomatic tactics partly explain the 
outcome of the peace process in the French war in Indo-
China.We will look at common bargaining issues first. 
Both sides wanted an armistice,although they disagreed 
on the precise terms of it.France,for example,wanted to 
forbid Vietminh troops from entering French controlled 
areas.The Vieminh wanted to exclude from the peace talks 
Communist forces stationed in Laos and Cambodia. 252 
Nevertheless,despite these differences we do see that both 
sides were agreed on one fundamental point-namely the 
necessity of an armistice to end hostilities. 
The talks began badly for the French.On June 8th 
1954,a day after the talks opened,French delegates received 
news of the fall of the Dien Bein Phu garrison with the 
loss of thousands of French soldiers.Yet,when the talks 
252 Randle, Geneva, pp .130-3 3. 
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ended a month later,France could reasonably claim a major 
diplomatic success.The French used two of the diplomatic 
tactics described by Paul Pillar,namely,the threat of 
escalation and the imposition of a one month deadline. 
The despatching of additional French troops to Indo-
china was discussed by Prime Minister Mendes-France and his 
advisers on June 24th 1954.This decision was later endorsed 
by the French National Defence Council on June 28th. 253 
These decisions clearly reflect the French desire to 
bolster their bargaining position at the Geneva Conference. 
Mendes-France played an important role in the 
peacemaking process as well.His dramatic one month 
timetable speeded up the peace process. The deadline also 
focused delegates minds on the necessity for securing an 
armistice. It also meant that if the talks ended with no 
agreement, then all the participants would lose face. 254 
However,Pillar's ideas about tactics to secure an 
agreement only partially explain the outcome of the Geneva 
Conference.There was an important additional factor not 
discussed by Pillar.This was the diplomatic pressure 
exerted by the Peoples Republic of China and the United 
States.We will deal with the PRC first. 
According to Eden's account of the Conference,it seems 
that from June 19th up until the middle of July 1954 the 
253 P. Devillers and J. Lacouture, End of a war: 
Geneva 1954,(London:Pall Mall Press,1969),pp.255-
58;and Randle,Geneva 1954,p.306,312. 
254 Devillers and Lacouture,pp.181-83;and Randle,Geneva 
1954,p.249. 
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Vietminh were put under a great deal of pressure by 
China,to withdraw Vietminh troops from Laos and Cambodia.on 
the 19th June,Premier Chou En Lai told the British Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden that China would use its political 
leverage on the Vietminh to force them to withdraw from 
Laos. 255 On July 20th the Vietminh agreed to do this. 256 
Chou En Lai may well have used his leverage on the Vietminh 
to force this concession,although it has to be said that 
the lack of documentation from the Vietminh makes this 
conclusion difficult to corroborate. 
It also seems that America helped bolster the French 
diplomatic position at Geneva by threatening to send 
American troops to the colony.This possiblity had been 
discussed by American and French officials from April 
through to the first week of June 1954. 257 The American 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Vice President 
Richard Nixon had both publicly raised the prospect of US 
involvement in speeches during March and April 1954. 258 
This explicit threat of intervention may well have 
pressurised the Vietminh to reach a settlement,but 
again,this is difficult to claim with any certainty because 
the Vietminh have not released any documents pertaining to 
the peace talks. 
At the Geneva Peace Conference from May 8th to July 
255 Eden,p.129, 140. 
256 Randle,Geneva 1954 ,p.154. 
257 ibid,pp.52-105;and Devillers and Lacouture,pp.73-114. 
258 Randle,Geneva 1954,p.60. 
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20th 1954,the French managed to salvage peace with 
honour.If one looks at the settlement terms,France did well 
at the Conference.The French managed to persuade the 
Vietminh to accept a demarcation line along the 17th 
Parallel,even though the Vietminh had considerable control 
below the 17th Parallel.The French pressed for,and 
obtained,delayed elections on the unification of 
Vietnam.This gave the Bao Dai government time to 
consolidate its position in the South.Third,the Vietminh 
withdrew from Laos,and the French were permitted to have 
military bases on Laotian territory.The Conference was a 
diplomatic victory for the French,and rather less than 
satisfactory for the Vietminh. 259 
Pillar's ideas on bargaining tactics seem to be 
supported by the French experience in Indo-China where the 
threat of military escalation and the month deadline were 
both helped to secure an agreement. One could also argue 
that American and Communist Chinese pressure guarranteed 
the effectiveness of these French tactics at the peace 
table. 
The ideas of Randle and Pillar on common aims and 
diplomatic bargaining tactics also seem to be supported by 
events in the Franco-Algerian War.We will deal first with 
the idea of common interests. 
Both sides were agreed on the need to open peace talks 
and both sides agreed in principle to the idea of a 
ceasefire.The devil was in the detail however,with both 
259 Eden,pp.140-42 ;and Randle ,Geneva 1954, pp. 342-349. 
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sides at loggerheads on several fundamental points.For 
example,France wanted to protect the rights of white French 
settlers in the newly independent state of Algeria.She also 
wanted to exclude the Sahara Desert from the peace 
discussions because she wanted to develop the oil resources 
contained beneath its shifting sands.Finally,France wanted 
a ceasefire before the peace talks began. 260 All this 
suggests that France had abandoned all hope of keeping 
Algeria in the French Union. In complete contrast to the 
French climbdown,the FLN stuck to their original war aims 
laid down at the Soummam Conference in 1956:France had to 
concede independence;only the FLN could represent the 
Algerian people, and the Sahara Desert was to remain an 
integral part of Algeria.We can see that both sides 
disagreed over the fundamentals prior to the start of the 
peace talks in 1960 .However, it was the French desire to 
withdraw combined with both sides hope of a ceasefire which 
kept the talks alive in a somewhat tortuous peace process 
which was to last two years. 
Pillar's ideas on bargaining tactics also seem 
relevant to the negotiations to end the Algerian war in the 
sense that the use of a hardline,no concession approach by 
one of the belligerents led to agreement.An analysis of the 
various peace proposals shows how this occurred. 
The first official talks between France and the FLN 
were held at Melun in France from 25th-29th June 
1960.France wanted a ceasefire to be followed by peace 
uo Talbott,p.222. 
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talks.In addition,France refused to let Ben Bella take part 
in negotiations with senior French officials because he was 
languishing in a French prison.The FLN refused all of these 
conditions and insisted on their aims of independence and 
their right to represent the Algerian people.The talks 
collapsed without agreement. 261 
By May 1961 France had made significant concessions. 
They dropped their demand for an unconditional ceasefire, 
pledged to release thousands of FLN prisoners, and 
recognised that only the FLN should negotiate on behalf of 
the Algerian people. 262 At this point of time France had 
made all the concessions whilst the FLN had made none.FLN 
success seems to support Pillar's view that hardline 
approaches do work. 
After May 1961 two issues remained unresolved:the 
territorial integrity of Algeria and settler rights. 
Disagreement on these issues led to the breakdown of the 
first Evian talks which took place from May 20th-June 13th 
161 and also the Lugrin talks held from July 20th-28th 
1961. 263 The FLN reiterated their uncompromising stance 
when,on August 28th 1961,they issued a communique pledging 
to continue their military struggle against France. 26 ' 
2 n Horne,pp.394-96;and Behr,p.175. 
262 c.H.Favrod, 'The Swiss and Secret Negotiations,' in 
Rioux(ed),pp.405-6;Horne,pp.466-8;and Talbott, 
pp.220-2. 
263 Horne ,pp. 470-1 ;O'Ballance ,pp.191-2 ;Talbott,pp. 223-4; 
and Behr,p.186. 
264 Horne , p • 4 7 9 . 
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FLN intransigence over settler and oil rights paid 
off.On September 5th 1961,De Gaulle dropped France's claim 
to the Sahara and in a radio broadcast on October 2nd he 
conceded Algerian independence. 265 A few months later on 
18th February 1962 he dropped his insistence on settler 
rights. 266 
The Evian Treaty signed on March 18th 1962 involved 
substantial French concessions.Algeria gained her 
independence and retained her control of the Sahara Desert 
and the oil resources contained within.There was a gradual 
withdrawal of French troops over a period of twelve 
months.French settlers were given the choice of Algerian 
citizenship or foreign national status. 267 The agreement, 
which involved the humbling of a major European power,seems 
to vindicate Pillar's view on the efficacy of hardline 
approaches in peace bargaining.The FLN's tough bargaining 
worked because the French had already decided the leave the 
colony. 
Analysis of the Portuguese war in Mozambique also 
supports the ideas of Randle and Pillar regarding 
commonality of bargaining aims and diplomatic 
tactics.The convergence of Frelimo and Portuguese 
objectives is seen in the opening peace proposals. It is 
probable that the worsening politico-military conditions 
inside Mozambique forced Spinola and his supporters such as 
~
5 Talbott,pp.224,227-8. 
266 ibid,p.228;and Horne,pp.511-15. 
267 Horne,pp.520-21;and Talbott,pp.229-31. 
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General Costa Gomes to press for an immediate ceasefire 
followed by a referendum on self determination. This new 
offer was made during the first round of the Lusaka 
talks which ended on 9th June. 268 On the other hand, Samora 
Machel wanted Portugal to recognise the Mozambicans' 
inalienable right to independence, transfer power to the 
Mozambican people and recognise Frelimo as the Mozambicans' 
sole representative. 269 Clearly, both sides wanted peace and 
Portugal's proposals indicate the growing recognition in 
Lisbon that independence was imminent.After all,if a 
referendum was held on self determination in Mozambique a 
vote for independence was a likely result. In short a 
commonality of interests existed from the outset of the 
talks. 
The Mozambican War also supports Pillar's view that 
the adoption of a hardline approach by one of the 
belligerents can lead to peace.Frelimo consistently stuck 
to its demand for independence.For example,Machel rejected 
the proposed referendum and renewed his insistence on 
independence on the 13th June. 270 A month later Portugal 
bowed to Frelimo's demands and accepted independence.A 
peace agreement was signed between the belligerents on 
September 8th 1974. 
We now have to consider why hardline tactics worked in 
the negotiations to end the war in Mozambique. The key 
268 The Times, lOth June 1974. 
269 The Times, 5th September 1974. 
270 The Times, 14th June 1974. 
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reason for Frelimo's successful hardline approach was that 
Portugal's position significantly worsened in the last 
months of the war,with Mozambique tottering on the brink of 
anarchy.Soldiers deserted at Boane and elsewhere. Others 
refused to fight.There was widespread fraternisation 
between Frelimo and Portuguese troops in Tete,Manica and 
Sofala.In towns and cities there were strikes and 
demonstrations.Frelimo's attacks edged closer to Lorenco 
Marques,hitherto untouched by the war.The Beira-Malawi 
train route was continually attacked.An analogy from the 
game of poker is pertinent here.Portugal had been dealt a 
weak hand at the Lusaka peace talks.She could not out-bid 
Frelimo because the guerrilla movement had all the 
high cards. Bluffing was out of the question. Portugal's 
military position was obviously collapsing in the closing 
stages of the war. 
There is some evidence that Frelimo used military 
coercion to secure a peace agreement.From August through to 
September 1974 Frelimo increased its attacks on Portuguese 
positions.The key railway link from Beira to Rhodesia 
was constantly sabotaged. Frelimo attacks edged closer to 
Lourenco Marques the capital of Mozambique.It is possible 
that Frelimo stepped up its campaign in the last months of 
the war in order to achieve concessions from Portugal. 
However,without documentary evidence this assertion is 
difficult to prove. 
The worsening situation in Mozambique provided the 
backdrop for the Portuguese acceptance of an independent 
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Mozambican state. 271 Once Portugal conceded independence 
the main barrier to a successful resolution had been 
removed.The peace agreement was signed on 8th September,and 
the date for independence was set for 25th June 
1975.Frelimo was to take over an interim government,with 
six ministries controlled by Frelimo, and the Portuguese 
running the Health, Public Works and Transport 
Departments.Portuguese and Frelimo troops would patrol 
Mozambique's borders and the ceasefire would be controlled 
by a joint military commission. Finally Frelimo agreed to 
accept financial obligations left over from the colonial 
era,namely the funding of the Cabera Bassa Hydro-electric 
power project in the Tete district. 272 The Portuguese 
capitulation clearly supports Pillar's view that hardline 
approaches to bargaining do in fact frequently produce 
peace.The hardline approach adopted by Frelimo worked 
because Portugal was anxious to withdraw from Mozambique 
regardless of the political cost. 
Timasheff:Durable Peace Settlements 
Nicholas Timasheff argued that a durable peace 
treaty required all belligerents to be more or less 
satisfied with the settlement.Dissatisfaction,he 
suggested, would lead to resentment and possibly another 
war. 273 
271 The Times,17th August 1974. 
272 The Times, 9th and 21st September 1974. 
n 3 Timasheff,p.233. 
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We saw earlier that the Baling peace talks failed to 
end the Emergency in Malaya.The war was to last another 
five years,until,in 1960,Chin Peng and four hundred 
supporters fled over the border into the Thai jungles.There 
was no formal peace settlement-no treaty,no accords-just a 
gradual winding down of a long war.Since no agreement was 
signed Timasheff's idea does not seem relevant. 
However,Timasheff's idea about long lasting peace 
settlements does apply to the Inda-China case study.We saw 
earlier that the Geneva Accords on Indo-China had a 
military aspect and a political dimension. The first was 
honoured whilst the second was not.France implemented the 
military provisions, declared a ceasefire and began slowly 
withdrawing its troops from its ex-colony.Communist 
prisoners were also released.The French were content with 
this outcome.France had extricated itself from a long and 
brutal war and the Vietminh were also content that colonial 
occupation had ceased.There is no evidence that either the 
French or the Vietminh resented this state of affairs. 
Unfortunately,the political aspect of the Geneva 
Accords did cause considerable resentment,and arguably it 
was this anger which undermined the treaty. The Vietminh 
resented the division of Vietnam into North and South.It 
also seems that the South Vietnamese resented having to 
call a referendum on unification because of the likelihood 
that Ho Chi Minh would win.The Vietminh's anger at the 
division of Vietnam was reinforced by the South's refusal 
to carry out the referendum.As a result the Vietminh 
126 
stepped up its activities in the south,undermining the Diem 
Govenment.This state of affairs led Stanley Karnow to 
observe that the Accords were merely a temporary truce in 
a long and bloody war. Thus, Timsaheff 's thesis seems to 
hold.Resentment clearly undermined the Geneva peace 
settlements and led to further bloodshed. 
Timasheff's ideas about the durability of peace 
settlements also seems to be applicable to the 
Franco-Algerian war.The Evian Agreements ended the Algerian 
war.De Gaulle and the FLN successfully negotiated an end to 
an eight year war which had cost the lives of 15000 French 
troops and about 140, OOO Algerians. The end of France's 
costly colonial commitment meant that De Gaulle could 
concentrate on his aim of modernising and restoring the 
grandeur of France.The FLN achieved its goal of 
independence and installed itself as the government of the 
new state.The Evian Accords did cause some resentment,but 
fortunately not enough to undermine the treaty.For 
example,many French settlers in Algeria were angry with the 
settlement,and thousands voted with their feet and left the 
new state.Out of a pre war French population of one million 
about 150,000 remained at war's end. 274 Later on,in the 
1990s,Algeria suffered political problems resulting from 
religious and tribal divisions,but none of these was caused 
by resentment about the Evian Accords and the treaty was 
not undermined by subsequent political problems. 
274 Maurice Larkin, France Since the Popular Front, 
(Oxford:Clarendon Press,1988.Reprinted 1990 and 
1991),p.278. 
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Finally,Timasheff's idea about durable peace also 
seems to stand up in the Mozambican case study.Portugal and 
Frelimo were both satisfied with the outcome.The subsequent 
civil war which ended in 1994 was largely unrelated 
to the peace settlement.The civil war between Frelimo and 
Renamo was based on tribal and ideological lines.It seems 
probable that the war of independence was sufficient to 
unite the many different tribes under a common cause-to rid 
Mozambique of Portugal.Once this aim was achieved in 1975, 
the raison d'etre of the Frelimo coalition fell apart and 
civil war began shortly afterwards. 
summary 
Randle and Pillar's ideas about common interests 
and peace making can be applied to all of the case 
studies.In Malaya neither Britain nor the MCP shared common 
interests and as a result the war continued.In Indo-China 
the French and Vietminh's desire for a ceasefire ensured 
the success of the Geneva talks.In Algeria the desire for 
a ceasefire brought the belligerents to the bargaining 
table.Portugal's desire for a cessation of hostilities 
whatever the cost was an opportunity too good to miss for 
Frelimo. 
Pillar's ideas about bargaining tactics seem 
applicable to three of the case studies.In Malaya we have 
no evidence that Britain or MCP used any of the tactics 
outlined by Pillar.The one month deadline and threat of 
military escalation helped secure the agreement which 
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terminated the French war in Indo-China. The hardline, no 
concession,approach used by the FLN ended the Algerian war 
and secured, for the FLN at least, a highly advantageous 
agreement with all their core aims realised.Likewise in 
Mozambique the tough line adopted by Frelimo ensured the 
termination of the war with all of Frelimo's core aims 
achieved. 
It seems that the tactics outlined by Pillar are 
effective if any of the following three conditions are 
present.First,external pressure;second,a deteriorating 
military position for one of the belligerents;third, a 
political desire to terminate the war whatever the cost. 
Timasheff's ideas about durable peace settlements are 
also supported by three of the case studies.In Malaya his 
thesis does not apply because neither Britain or the MCP 
signed an agreement to end the war.With regard to 
Inda-China his idea seems applicable to the post war 
situation.Ho Chi Minh was unhappy at the division of 
Vietnam below the 17th parallel and Diem's government in 
South Vietnam refused to hold a referendum on 
unification.As a result the treaty was undermined and war 
resumed in the late 1950s. 
In Algeria the Evian Accords were durable.Both 
belligerents were satisfied with the outcome.The Lusaka 
Accords which terminated the war in Mozambique have also 
proved to be durable.Although a civil war began soon after 
the war ended it had nothing do with resentment with the 
Lusaka agreement and everything to do with tribal and 
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ideological splits within the newly independent state. 
Durable peace occurs when the core aims of the victor 
are realised and when the loser achieves at least a face 
saving resolution of the war.Unrealised war aims and the 
failure by one side to carry out the provisions of a peace 
agreement will undermine the peace treaty and possibly lead 
to further conflict. 
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Chapter Ten 
Conclusions.Policy Implications and Further Research 
Theories of Victory 
The table below displays the results of the 
application of O'Connor's theories of victory.First, 
O'Connor argued that a victory is an outcome satisfactory 
to at least one of the belligerents and includes the 
attainment of independence.Second,O'Connor argued that the 
side which wins the hearts and minds of a people will win 
a colonial war. 
First Idea Second Idea 
Satisfactory Outcome Hearts and Minds 
Malaya Applicable Applicable 
British Victory Malayan Observables indicate 
Independence the failure of MCP to 
win hearts and minds. 
Indochina Not wholly applicable. Not wholly applicable. 
Partial Victory for Vietminh success in 
both sides.Vietminh Tonkin;French success 
very dissatisfied. in Cochinchina. 
Algeria Not wholly applicable Not wholly applicable. 
French Containment of FLN success in Aures 
FLN. and Kabylia,but weak 
Algerian Independence in towns. 
Mozambique Applicable Applicable 
Mozambican Independence Observables indicate 
Frelimo success. 
O'Connor's victory ideas as applied to the four case 
studies 
O'Connor correctly pointed out that the side which 
manages to win the hearts and minds usually wins the 
insurgency.The Vietminh,FLN and Frelimo seem to have been 
better at this than their colonial opponents.Despite 
conventional force inferiority,the liberation movements 
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managed to hold out,refusing to admit defeat.For example in 
Mozambique,a Portuguese army command report of September 
1973 estimated that it would take at least another fifteen 
years to defeat Frelimo. 275 
Colonial warfare poses a cruel dilemma for an imperial 
power because in order to win it has to grant major 
political concessions and yet failure to reform will result 
in defeat.Events in Indo-China,Algeria and Mozambique show 
this to be the case. 
Berenice's Carrol's Concept of 'Victory.' 
Berenice Carroll defined 'victory' as the creation of 
a victor and vanquished relationship between two 
belligerents. 276 Her idea is relevant to Malaya and 
Mozambique, but not to the Algerian and Inda-Chinese 
wars.Carroll's thesis cannot be applied to Indo-China 
because it is difficult to establish who the victor and 
vanquished were at war's end. In Algeria, we found that 
France won in the military sense of the term but still had 
to concede independence. 
A weakness of Carroll's idea is that it regards 
'victory' as a "zero-sum" game:one victor,one vanquished, 
just like a game of tennis. Victory is not like this. Her 
idea does not take account of the possibility of the 
partial attainment of military and political aims.It is 
possible to have two partial victors in a war.We saw this 
275 Henriksen,Revolution and Counterrevolution,p. 56. 
276 Carroll, 'How Wars End ... ' ,pp. 305-306. 
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in the Indochina case study where both the Vietminh and 
France could claim a partial victory. 
Her thesis needs to be modified by making a 
distinction between military and political victory.If 
applied to the Algerian war,we can see the following 
result.France won the war in the military sense,but the FLN 
was the political victor because Algeria gained 
independence,with the FLN being the sole party of 
government in the new state. 
Termination Points 
Lewis Coser suggested that the capture of major 
strategic asset indicated the ending of a war.Galtung and 
Kecskemeti noted that irreversible qualitative shifts on 
the battlefield were imminent signs of a war's end. 
Klingberg and Voevodsky maintained that high casualties and 
successive defeats were signs that a war would soon end.The 
following table summarises the results of our application 
of their theories to the historical reality of colonial 
warfare. 
Wars End Coser Galtung and Klingberg and 
Kecskemeti Voevodsky 
Malaya N\A Yes-1951 Yes.1957-60 
1960 
Indochina Yes-1953 Yes-1953 Yes.Dec 1952-
1954 June 1953 
Algeria N\A Yes-1959 Yes-1957-59 
1962 
Mozambique N\A Yes-1972/73 Yes-1972-74 
1974 
Termination Points when applied to the Four Case studies 
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In Algeria, Indochina, and Mozambique, the termination 
point that seems to have tipped the balance was the 
realisation by the colonial power that the war was 
militarily unwinnable.In the Indochina War this occurred in 
1952-1953,in Algeria in 1959,and in Mozambique from 1972-
1973.In each of these three cases the realisation occurred 
after a major effort had resulted in military failure. 
Termination points in colonial wars are characterised 
by the existence of time lags between 'termination point 
crossed' and 'actual war termination.'These time lags 
varied from war to war. In Malaya there was a nine-year 
lag;in Indo-China a two-year lag;in Algeria a three-year 
time lag;and in Mozambique a two-year lag.Time lags exist 
because of the nature of colonial warfare,with its emphasis 
on winning people over to a particular cause,and its method 
of conducting the actual fighting-fortifying villages, 
manning checkpoints, conducting ambushes and skirmishes.But 
the time lag does not affect the validity of 
the argument. 
Public Opinion and De-Escalation 
Edward Azar suggested that rising public dis-
satisfaction with a war will lead to military de-escalation 
and the normalisation of political relations. 
Azar's idea cannot be applied to the Malayan 
Emergency.Britain de-escalated in the period from 1957-60 
because the MCP was driven out of all Malayan states except 
Johore and Perak.A successful COIN campaign allowed the de-
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escalation.We therefore have the interesting example of a 
case of a victor choosing to de-escalate a war,whereas Azar 
suggests that the onus to de-escalate a war usually rests 
with the losing side. 
It seems clear that public opinion will not 
necessarily force policy makers to de-escalate a war.For 
example,in both Algeria and Indo-China,France maintained a 
high troop presence up to and after peace agreements were 
signed.The French wanted to secure an honourable withdrawal 
from Indochina and a robust military presence was vital if 
this aim was to be achieved.The Cold War prevented France 
and the North Vietnam from normalising relations.In Algeria 
France maintained a high troop presence to curtail OAS and 
FLN terrorism from 1960-62.In this case a large troop 
presence was needed to maintain civil order.Despite the 
absence of military de-escalation,France and Algeria 
normalised relations at war's end. 
Unlike the Malayan,Indo-Chinese and Algerian case 
studies,the de-escalation process in Mozambique seems to 
support Azar's ideas.The fraternisation between Frelimo and 
Portuguese troops in the last six months of the war 
indicates a move away from hatred and distrust to a 
normalisation of relations.Portugal had re-ranked her aims 
with war termination being the main priority. 
Domestic Factors Delaying War Termination 
Five domestic factors delay war termination. First, 
interest groups can block war termination. Soldiers and 
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settlers blocked war termination in Algeria.Second,there is 
the economic justification for retaining colonial empires. 
Algeria contained large natural gas deposits.Mozambique was 
an important southern African trade hub, its ports and 
railways processing goods from South Africa,Rhodesia,Zambia 
and Malawi.Third,a state can continue fighting a war if it 
receives outside aid.Both the French and Portuguese were 
greatly aided by foreign military help.By 1953-54,the 
Americans were paying for more than half of France's 
military expenditure in the Inda-Chinese war. Fourth, 
ideological factors can block war termination. This was 
true in Indochina and in Mozambique where the colonial 
powers perceived a major communist threat to their colonial 
interests.The other ideological factor was the belief that 
empires conferred greatness on the colonisers concerned. 
Losing colonies meant a loss of prestige and influence in 
international affairs. 
This last point is an important one because it ties in 
with a fifth factor which delayed war termination,namely 
the Portuguese and French theories of Empire.France and 
Portugal regarded their colonies as part of la patrie or 
the motherland.Even in 1998,overseas France still exists-
(Tahiti and the Comorro Islands for example,or Macau,which 
is still part of overseas Portugal.) The belief that 
colonies are intrinsically part of the motherland explains 
the reluctance of the colonial powers to let the colonies 
go.This paternalistic attitude hindered the French and 
Portuguese COIN campaigns.It meant they were reluctant to 
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grant autonomy to the colonies and sponsor alternative 
national parties. 
These feelings and attitudes helped block numerous 
attempts to open peace talks.In Indo-China settlers 
thwarted calls for peace by Mendes France in 1950.During 
the Franco-Algerian War,Pierre Poujade and his military and 
civilian supporters and sypathisers resisted two peace 
attempts in 1956 and 1958. 
Re-Orientation 
It is possible to refer to a 'domestic origin of 
peace' in the Mozambican War of Independence,and the two 
French wars in Algeria and Inda-China.Once the politicians 
involved realised the wars were unwinnable they decided to 
withdraw. Although the military position in Algeria was a 
stalemate,the prospect of huge overseas defence costs for 
years to come,coupled with fighting an enemy content just 
to survive,were probably the main factors that tipped the 
balance in favour of war termination.In Algeria,Indo-China 
and Mozambique,regime change was vital for the peace 
process. It seems that wars can be terminated only when 
those associated with failed war policies are removed from 
office. 
Domestic factors play a decisive role in war 
termination in lengthy unconventional wars where the 
military results are unclear.They are also important when 
states are defending secondary values.If it is a colony or 
a far away ally which is under attack, rather than the 
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mother country,and if there are no tangible gains at 
stake,then the public may question the wisdom of defending 
'secondary' values.Portugal's war in Mozambique is a good 
illustration of this point.Other examples of this occurring 
include the Franco-Indo-Chinese War and the Franco-Algerian 
War of 1954-1962. 
Conversely,if a group is defending its core or primary 
values in a war,then only military defeat will lead to war 
termination.Domestic factors seem to be less important for 
insurgent movements whose primary concern is independence 
from a colonial power.If one compares colonial warfare to 
a test of wills,those fighting for their core values are 
clearly less likely to succumb to domestic pressures for 
termination than those fighting to defend secondary values. 
Ceasefires and Peacemaking 
The table on the following page displays the results 
of our application of the theories of Randle,Pillar and 
Timasheff to the four case studies. 
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Common Aims? Pillar's tactics Timasheff's 
Results 
Malaya No No evidence Abortive 
Indochina Yes:Both sides Timetable plus Ceasefire 
threat of 
escalation 
Algeria Yes-both sides FLN policy of no Political 
concessions Settlement 
Mozambique Yes-Portugal Frelimo pursued Political 
policy of no Settlement 
concessions . ~ Application of the ideas of Randle.Pillar and Timasheff to 
the four case studies 
It is perhaps not surprising that the Baling peace 
talks in Malaya were abortive.We saw earlier that neither 
Britain nor the MCP revalued their priorities.Britain and 
the MCP had fundamental differences at Baling.As a result, 
Pillar's bargaining tactics do not seem to apply in the 
Malayan case.Following on from this,Timasheff's theory does 
not apply either.There was no political or military 
settlement and hence nothing to resent or be pleased about. 
When we come to the case of Indo-China we see that 
Timasheff 's views seem at first to cast some doubt on 
Randle's and Pillar's ideas.Both sides wanted a 
ceasefire. We also saw that Mendes-Framce threatened to 
escalate the war and imposed a month deadline.In 
theory,peace ought to have been durable-the political pre-
conditions existed and an imaginative combination of 
bargaining tools were used to secure an agreement.Yet peace 
in the ex-French colony was short-lived.This situation 
occurred because neither Ho Chi Minh nor Ngo Dinh Diem-the 
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leaders of North and South Vietnam respectively-were 
prepared to abide by the agreement.Both were influenced by 
wider political and ideological considerations.Ho wanted to 
unite Vietnam and form a unified Communist republic and was 
quite prepared to use war as an instrument of state policy 
to achieve this aim.Diem (and his American sponsors) were 
anxious to preserve the capita list status quo in South 
Vietnam.With both North and South on a virtual collision 
course,war became more rather than less likely in the late 
1950s. 
The Mozambique and Algerian cases clearly suggest 
that,in certain circumstances,hardline bargaining tactics 
work. It seems that these tactics work when one of the 
belligerents is anxious to disengage from the 
war, regardless of political cost and wounded pride. This 
state of affairs occurred in Mozambique because of a 
deteriorating military situation. It occurred in Algeria 
because De Gaulle wanted to concentrate on rebuilding the 
grandeur of France,rather than shoring up a colonial 
anachronism. 
Conclusion 
So far we have tested the applicability of war 
termination theories against four case studies .At this 
point is may be useful to go further than this by 
identifying some policymaking implications which will 
enable soldiers and statesmen to appreciate at what stage 
of a war termination process they have reached. 
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First,however,it is necessary to devise a system or 
framework whoch would enable them to judge how well or 
badly a campaign is going ,and we need to identify those 
indicators which suggest that wars are about to end. 
The system or framework could perhaps be based upon 
observable behaviour such as the scale of the military 
violence measured by the size of rebel forces attacking 
colonial positions,and the pattern of military violence-i.e 
is it spreading or confined to a certain area? Both these 
things can be measured by the number of attacks in a 
certain area, and the size of the attacking forces. These 
calculations will help a belligerent to judge how well or 
how badly a campaign is going. 
The indicators which point to the ending of a war are 
of two types.The first is military whilst the second is 
political.Military indicators include the following.First, 
loss of control of vital strategic assets such as walled 
villages.Second,evidence that the war is spreading to other 
parts of the country. Third, signs that rebel forces are 
increasingly moving around in broad daylight and in 
strength.Fourth,the capture of senior rebel commanders and 
large caches of weapons. 
Political indicators might include the 
following. First, willingness on the part of one of the 
belligerents to offer peace talks.For example,the Vietminh 
in late 1953 made it known that they were interested in 
starting peace talks with the French.Second,growing public 
opinion in favour of terminating a war. This is easil~ 
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measured by the use of opinion surveys. 
It is clear that war termination occurs when the will 
to stop a war becomes greater than will to continue 
fighting. The will to stop fighting occurs either when 
military aims have been attained,or when one side has been 
defeated on the battlefield,or when the cost of continuing 
the war becomes prohibitively high.In the case of 
prohibitive costs,the pressure to stop fighting arises from 
economic pressures,military sections of a bureaucracy,or 
from politicians,or international pressure from other 
states,or a combination of these four forces. 
Further Research 
Further research on war termination will need to test 
the validity of the hypothesis outlined in this Conclusion. 
Another line of research would be the testing of the 
following ideas.First,colonial powers will not win a 
colonial war in the mid to late twentieth century unless 
they first realise that winning the hearts and minds of a 
population requires them to grant eventual independence. 
Victory is this sense does not mean retention of a 
colony.It means denying one nationlist party the right to 
govern and transferring that right to another,possibly less 
extreme party.The British experience in Malaya provides a 
good illustration of a successful 'Victory by denial' 
strategy. The British decision to grant independence, so 
early in the Emergency greatly helped the COIN programmes 
and robbed the MCP of its claim that it alone could offer 
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independence.Instead,the United Malayan Nationalist 
Organisation (UMNO) took power in the newly independent 
state, where it still rules. Cultural, economic, military, legal 
and political ties between Britain and Malaysia are strong. 
Compared to other states 
democratic institutions 
in South East Asia, Malaysia's 
are relatively robust and 
stable,and its people are prosperous,despite the financial 
turmoil of 1997 and 1998. 
Second,it would be interesting to test the following 
hypothesis: nationalism as an idea cannot be defeated by a 
colonial power. Even if an insurgency is defeated 
militarily, nationalist ideas will remain imprinted on the 
hearts of the survivors.Sooner or later they will prevail. 
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